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ABSTRACT
The wave of turmoil in Asian currencies in 1997 has put, again, the economic 
research o f currency crisis or speculative attack on the forefront of old debates in finding 
the main causes of the crises. Two generations of currency crisis models coexist since 
the crises that occurred in some member countries of European Monetary System (EMS), 
and Mexico during the 1970s-1990s.
The first group of models regard inconsistency between macroeconomic 
fundamentals and the existing fixed exchange rate regime as the root of the crisis. More 
recent theoretical researches, which are so-called second generation models of 
speculative attacks, put more weight on the speculation itself than on the bad economic 
fundamentals, in examining the driving force of collapse of a fixed exchange rate 
regime. However, the Korean currency crisis during 1997 could not be understood on the 
basis of only an one-sided view. The Korean crisis seems to have both characteristics of 
first and second generation models; a mixture of weak fundamentals (stressed in the first 
view), and factors leading to a self-fulfilling attack such as financial panic and 
contagion effects (emphasized in the second view).
In this regard, this paper attempts to examine the main causes of the Korean 
currency crisis by introducing the features stressed in both generation models. For this 
purpose, this paper develops a theoretical framework, which is based on the modified 
monetary model of exchange rate determination (or modified first generation models). 
The model includes the following assumptions: (1) a relaxation of the purchasing power 
parity condition; (2) an inclusion of income in the money demand equation; (3) a
sterilization of the reserve losses; (4) inclusions o f  external credit shocks as well as 
domestic credit shocks; (5) inclusions of currency substitution motive and non­
performing loans in the money demand function; and (6) an introduction o f a time- 
varying risk premium to the interest parity condition. Based on this extended theoretical 
model, one-period-ahead probabilities o f  fixed exchange rate regime are derived using 
the estimated reserve floor and shadow exchange rates.
The empirical model performs relatively well since it predicts high ex ante collapse 
probabilities during the crisis and lower bounds for the new post-collapse market clearing 
exchange rates. The principal research findings show that the collapse probability of the 
Korean exchange rate regime might have been lowered by decreasing the external credit 
shocks, the magnitude of sterilization, and the variability of relative price shocks. The 
impact of the uncertainty surrounding domestic credit growth on the probabilities of 
regime collapse varies during the sample period.
In addition to these results, this paper provides some policy implications for 
avoiding a future currency crisis. The implications are taken from both generation 
models: (1) the need of maintaining stable economic fundamentals (especially, current 
account balance and enough accumulation of usable foreign reserves) along with a more 
flexible exchange rate system; (2) the need of a stable financial system by controlling 
capital flows and thus by avoiding a moral hazard problem.
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
In the aftermath of the 1992 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis in the 
European Monetary System (EMS) and the 1994 Mexican peso crisis, old debates have 
been revived concerning the roles of economic fundamentals and speculation in tracing 
out the determinants of the currency crises.
Before the ERM crisis of 1992-93 took place, there was consensus in explaining the 
main driving force of speculative attacks on the currency: inconsistency between 
government's long-term macroeconomic policies and government’s willingness to 
maintain the fixed exchange rate regime. However, the advents of ERM and Mexican 
crises in the early 1990s forced some economists not to regard the above inconsistency as 
a main cause o f the speculative attacks. They believe that the EMS countries and Mexico 
who experienced crises were performing sound macroeconomic polices along with their 
exchange rate systems when investors attacked their currencies. Some economists 
emphasize the importance of speculation itself as a main force of regime collapse.
The first view that was developed in response to the currency crises in developing 
countries such as Mexico (1973-82) and Argentina (1978-81), called first generation 
models of speculative attack, was initiated by Krugman (1979) and simplified by Flood 
and Garber (1984b) and others.^ As a main source of the crisis, the first generation 
models stress the relation between investors’ speculative behavior and deteriorating 
macroeconomic fundamentals that are related to the determinants of exchange rate and
A useful survey o f the first generation models of speculative attacks is found in Agénor, et al. (1992).
the government budget deficit. That is, these models show how the co-movement of a 
fixed exchange rate policy and overly expansive fundamentals ends with a transition of 
the peg into a floating regime, faced with investors’ efforts to make profit by attacking 
the currency.
According to this view, collapse of the peg is inevitable when the central bank 
international reserves fall to a critical threshold level below which the reserves are 
abruptly exhausted by private speculation and thus the central bank abandons the 
currency peg. Thus, in this context, the collapse of the fixed regime is predictable and 
takes on the destiny of demise under a certain condition of the fundamentals. In short, 
any attempt to sustain a fixed exchange rate regime while simultaneously attempting to 
expand money supply for the purpose of financing fiscal deficit induces a fundamental 
inconsistency with the regime and then pushes the economy into crisis.
The second view attributes the cause of currency crises, especially those of ERM in 
1992-93 and the Mexican peso collapse in December 1994, to the market’s abrupt 
speculative activity, rather than to a preceding period of unsustainable government 
policies. The supporters of this view argue that pre-crisis macroeconomic fundamentals 
were not obviously inconsistent with existing fixed regimes in ERM and Mexico in the 
early 1990s. Therefore, they maintain that a period of nonsustainable government policy 
accompanied by gradual depletion of international reserves may be a necessary condition, 
but not a sufficient condition, for the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime. In this 
respect, they suggest a self-fulfilling crisis as an alternative interpretation on the recent 
currency crises, but with the following mechanism.
Assuming the existing government policies are consistent with macroeconomic 
fundamentals, the market is not expected to anticipate the gradual exhaustion of central 
bank foreign reserves. But, if the investors recognize the government’s intention to use 
more expansionary policies to cope with internal imbalance (e.g., growing 
unemployment) which may be induced by external shock such as the loss of 
competitiveness (and thus output decline), they may attack the currency by expecting 
more aggravating internal imbalance (e.g., the higher rate of unemployment). This 
worsening imbalance comes from the combination of an expansionary policy (in order to 
sweep internal imbalance) and a policy of increasing interest rates (in order to defend the 
currency peg). That is, this increase in the interest rates depresses the domestic economy 
and so leads it to worse unemployment. Thus, the loss of confidence in government 
commitment to defend the fixed regime by the above mechanism can generate an attack 
equilibrium and then lead to a currency collapse.
Put differently, in the presence of a central bank and government attempting to 
maximize internal objectives (such as output and employment) and external objectives 
(such as maintenance of the peg), a shift in the market’s expectation on the government 
policy can make a speculative attack self-fulfilling. Thus, the attack takes on the nature 
of multiple equilibria because arbitrary change in the private expectation yields the 
collapse of an otherwise viable exchange rate regime.^
On the other hand, the wave of meltdown of some Asian currencies in 1997 has 
pushed, again, the economic field of currency crisis to the forefront of economic studies. 
The negative impacts of these crises on their domestic economies and on the economy of
* Flood and Garber (1984b) and Obstfeld (1986b) first proposed the models which analyzed a speculative 
attack based on the fiamework of multiple equilibria.
the rest world are tremendous and may be unprecedented. Therefore, the two different 
views stated above are expected to compete in attempting to examine the 1997 Asian 
currency crises.
In feet, the Korean currency crisis seems to have characteristics of the above two 
different views on the basis of the following grounds.
First, the factors that might support the view of first generation models of a 
speculative attack (i.e., deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals and poor economic 
policies) are as follows.
Although the Korean currency, the won, had been depreciated against the U.S. 
dollar in the nominal term during the 1990s, its depreciation could not be regarded as 
large enough to compete in the world goods market because the yen/dollar rate had been 
increasing faster than the won/dollar rate since 1995.  ^ This gives an important 
implication about the loss of price competitiveness since a number o f Korean export 
products compete with Japanese exports in the world market. Therefore, the won might 
have been under pressure of the potential realignment (i.e., further depreciation).
The current account deficit marked a record high of 4.8 percent o f the GDP in 
1996.'* The large current account deficit itself can be problematic. However, a more 
important implication is how it is financed. That is, if the deficit is financed in a way that 
can yield a potential reversal problem, this imbalance would raise a question of its 
sustainability. Moreover, when the way of financing the current account imbalance
 ^The Japanese yen was depreciated over 50 percent until the summer of 1997 compared to the spring of 
1995. Between 1991 and 1995, the yen was very strong;80 yen per U.S. dollar.
Even though this large current accoimt deficit was mainly caused by the sharply increasing trade deficit 
that stemmed firom the slowdown of export growth due to external shocks such as adverse terms of trade 
(e.g., fall in the world price of semiconductors) and a long-period recession of Japanese economy, a 
question on the sustainability of the large current accoimt deficit can be raised because the deficit was 
aggravating since 1994.
provides a secondary problem for the banking system, the large current account deficit 
can be an important source of triggering a currency crisis. In fact, the way o f financing 
the current account deficit in Korea seems to fit the above case on the following ground.
The financing was mainly charmeled by the banking system in the form of short­
term foreign-currency denominated liabilities (i.e., unhedged borrowing) under the lack 
of prudential supervision and regulation of the financial system. When a number of 
questionable investments by Korean firms who borrowed largely fi"om domestic banking 
system became unprofitable due to shock such as slowdown of domestic and/or world 
economy, many of the firms went bankrupt. The banking system that borrowed fi'om 
abroad in the above way was more fi'agile with non-performing loans and was also 
vulnerable to speculative attacks in the event of a sudden loss of confidence by foreign 
investors (who had suspected the sustainability of Korean economy due to a large current 
account deficit and a misalignment of the peg since their observing of the southeast Asian 
currencies’ crashes). Thus, the large current account deficit in Korea can be regarded as 
a key force o f the 1997 currency crisis.
Other indicators that could be used as . measures of the condition in the 
macroeconomic fundamentals are the size and structure of foreign debt. The 
accumulation o f the foreign debt in Korea was increasing during the 1990s, reaching to 
more than $120 billion in the end o f 1997. Also, the ratio of external debt to GDP (which 
is fi'equently used as a measure of the external debt sustainability of a country) shows an 
upward trend through the 1990s. Especially, the ratio of short term external liabilities to 
total foreign debt and to foreign reserves remained at very high levels compared to other
developing countries/ This ratio is a crucial indicator of financial firagility. This 
aggravating debt structure played a key role in the 1997 Korean currency crisis. Since 
this bad debt structure gave rise to a situation where foreign investors were unwilling to 
roll over the existing short-term credit, Korea was exposed to the speculative attacks and 
suffered fi'om a serious liquidity problem. The amount of foreign reserves itself (about 
U.S.$29 billion in the first quarter of 1997) held by bank of Korea, which was increasing 
until the middle of 1996 and then gradually decreasing, was inadequate to withstand 
speculative attacks, compared to those of foreign reserves held by Singapore ($80 billion) 
and Taiwan (over $100 billion).^
On the other hand, there also seems to exist some evidences that the basis of the 
Korean crisis can be attributed to the features of second generation models of speculative 
attacks; self-fiilfilling and multiple equilibria natures of currency crises.
In the presence of unfavorable developments in some macroeconomic fundamentals 
such as growing current account deficit, increasing pressure on the exchange rates, and 
worsening debt structure, the collapse of Thai baht in early 1997 combined with the 
bankruptcies o f several Korean big business groups (chabotf pushed the Korean 
economy to a crisis when the domestic and foreign investors panicked and attacked the
 ^ In Korea, the ratio of short term foreign debt to total foreign debt was about 70% in the middle of 1997. 
This ratio was very high compared to the countries such as Indonesia (25%), Thailand (45%). Malaysia 
(40%), Mexico (15%), and Brazil (25%). The ratio of short term foreign debt to the foreign reserves also 
shows a much larger level (300%) in Korea than in the above countries: Indonesia (160%), Thailand 
(110%), Malaysia (55%), Mexico (125%), and Brazil (70%).
® The currencies of these countries are not regarded as experiencing a regime collapse, though the 
currencies were depreciated about 18% (in Taiwan) and 2% (in Singapore), respectively. These 
depreciation rates were far below those of the crisis-experienced Asian countries. The main reason of the 
Taiwan devaluation mainly stemmed from the appraisal of Taiwan’s competition problem rather than the 
shortage of the foreign reserves. Also, these countries are still accumulating foreign assets by running 
current account surpluses.
 ^ These chabols’ bankruptcies first occurred in a decade and originated from the long-term problems of 
economic and political structures in Korea.
won. In other words, although the story that deteriorating fundamentals along with a 
worsening banking system would be vulnerable to the internal and/or external shocks has 
been well-known to the investors for years, after the collapse of Thai baht, the market 
changed their relatively optimistic expectation about the above previously neglected 
economic problems which they regarded as minor. That is, when the foreign investors 
recognized the pressure on the Korean exchange rate due to the combination of the 
concern of contagion from southeast Asian crashes and the worsening economic 
conditions (e.g., the increasing burden of maintaining the exchange rate regime under a 
large current account deficit and decreasing foreign reserves; and vulnerable financial 
market), they hedged their investments by gradually attacking the won.
Especially, the pressure on the won became more severe when a competition 
problem surfaced after the 15 percent depreciation of the Taiwanese new dollar in 
October 1997, because Taiwan is a direct competitor in Korea’s major exports like 
semiconductors. Thus, the shift in the market’s expectation might have generated an 
attack equilibrium and then the attack became a self-fulfilling currency crisis of an 
otherwise viable exchange rate regime even under the same macroeconomic imbalances.
A. political instability could be considered as an additional source o f financial panic 
since the turmoil o f the presidential election (which was set in December 18, 1997) gave 
the market an impression of a lack of leadership to cope with the currency crisis.
Even if the pre-existing economic weaknesses themselves in Korea were not critical 
(or might not have seemed to be vulnerable) to the external/internal shocks under normal 
times, these weaknesses may surface and so could be vulnerable to the shocks when there 
is a speculative attack under the deteriorating economic situation. Thus, if this attack is
successful, it becomes a self-fiilfilling speculative attack and generates multiple 
equilibria. However, since this self-fulfilling crisis requires any motive of changing the 
market’s expectation, it is not a sufficient condition but a necessary condition for the 
currency crisis.
In short, the Korean currency crisis seems to have both natures o f first and second 
generation models o f speculative attacks, which are the mixture o f weak economic 
fundamentals and the factors leading to a self-fiilfilling attack such as financial panic and 
contagion.
In this respect, the purpose of this study is to examine the main causes of the 
Korean currency crisis on the basis of the estimated probability of regime collapse. First, 
the theoretical model is developed so as to capture the features that are stressed in the two 
generation models. In addition, the model is based on the monetary model of exchange 
rate determination that is a modified version of standard speculative models (i.e., a 
modified first generation model) such as Kmgman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984b).
This modification allows for the previously neglected factors in those models: (I) a 
relaxation o f purchasing power parity (PPP)— this reflects the presence o f overvaluation, 
in part, due to a higher rate of Korean inflation as compared to the world level (the 
deviation from PPP is divided into two factors, systematic and random deviations); (2) an 
inclusion of income in the money demand equation— this affects the probability and the 
timing of regime transition by allowing the real side of economy (i.e., output) to 
influence the real money balance; (3) a sterilization of the reserve losses during the attack 
period— this reflects the real economic policy adopted by the Korean monetary 
authorities at the time of attack; and (4) inclusions of external credit shocks as well as
domestic credit shocks— these shocks examine how the attack was triggered (that is, 
whether the shocks were externally or/and internally induced).
The theoretical model is further extended in order to describe the characteristics of 
second generation models as follows: (1) inclusions of the currency substitution motive 
and the ratio o f non-performing loans into the money demand function — this allows the 
model to capture the speculative behavior by changing speculator’s portfolio motives; 
and (2) an introduction of speculative shock to the model by permitting the risk premium 
(which is embedded in the interest parity condition) to vary period by period— the time- 
varying risk premia along with the external and internal shocks lead to a more realistic 
nature of the recent crisis event in Korea (i.e., uncertainty surrounding actual speculative 
attack).
This paper also provides the probability of regime collapse and shadow exchange 
rates using the solution of the econometric model which is developed on the basis of the 
above theoretical framework. For the explicit computation of the probability, the method 
of one-step-ahead forecast will be applied to the experience of Korea between 1995 and 
1998, using monthly data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter two briefly presents 
the previous studies on the currency crises which are concerned with the 1992-93 ERM, 
the 1994 Mexican, and the 1997 Asian crises (from the view points of both generation 
models). Chapter three provides a theoretical framework by modifying the standard 
speculative models and derives the probability of regime collapse and shadow exchange 
rate. This chapter also discusses the comparative statics to analyze how the collapse 
probability is sensitive to the changes in the variables and shocks in the model. Chapter
four estimates the critical reserve floor that will be used for the computation o f collapse 
probability in chapter five. This chapter also presents a brief review of the exchange rate 
system in Korea and gives an explanation o f the trend of international reserves along with 
the flows of current and capital accounts in the pre-crisis period. In chapter five, the 
patterns of pre-crisis macroeconomic variables will be briefly discussed, and this chapter 
also introduces the data analysis and estimation procedure. Then, the modified crisis 
model will be applied to the Korean experience. And the one-period-ahead probability 
and shadow exchange rate series are estimated using the empirical model. Based on the 
estimation results, this chapter analyzes the forces contributing to the Korean currency 
crisis and then examines the results of counterfactual experiments by changing the 
magnitude of variables and shocks in the model. This work provides some policy 
implications surrounding the Korean currency crisis. Chapter six draws conclusions and 
policy lessons.
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CHAPTER 2 
Survey of the Literature
2.1 Introduction
Two generations of currency crisis models examining the reasons why a fixed 
exchange rate regime may be subject to speculative pressure coexist in the literature.
The first models, called first generation models of speculative attack, have been 
widely attended by economists and extended to various directions after the theoretical 
work was initiated by Krugman (1979). This group of models were proposed to analyze 
the causes of the currency crises that occurred in Latin America in late 1970s and early 
1980s. These models regard, as a root of the crisis, inconsistency between 
macroeconomic fundamentals and the existing fixed exchange rate system, rather than 
considering that pure speculation is enough to trigger a crisis.
More recent theoretical researches, so-called second generation models of 
speculative attack, put more weight on the speculation itself than on the bad economic 
fundamentals in explaining the driving force of fixed regime collapse. The second 
generation models were originated in the work of Flood and Garber (1984a) and Obstfeld 
(1986b) and were used to examine the 1992-93 ERM and the 1994 Mexican currency 
crises. These models generate self-fulfilling attacks and multiple equilibria in that the 
change in speculators’ belief on the government’s policy is assumed to influence the 
government’s willingness whether or not to defend the currency peg.
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The next two sections describe these two generation models o f currency crisis in 
more detail and also present some models that illustrate the characteristics of two 
respective generation theories.
2.2 First Generation Models
The first generation models of currency crises rely on the conflict between 
macroeconomic policies and long-term maintenance of the fixed exchange rate. The 
speculative attacks stemming fi-om the conflict lead to a natural and an anticipated 
collapse of existing fixed regime. This trend of explaining balance of payment crises, 
initiated by Krugman (1979) and extended by Flood and Garber (1984b) and by others, 
emerged to understand the currency crises of Latin American countries such as Mexico 
(1973-1982) and Argentina (1978-1981).
The first generation models have generally the following several features. First, the 
theory is based on the macroeconomic models of exchange rate determination and 
monetary approach to the balance of payments in which the behavior o f fundamentals is 
mainly determined by a continuously expanded monetary stance to finance government 
budget deficit.
Second, the timing of the regime collapse depends on the amount and the depletion 
rate of central bank reserves. When the reserves hit critical threshold level by speculative 
attacks, the fixed regime is abandoned by monetary authorities. While this critical 
reserve floor may be known to monetary authorities, the speculators have no exact 
information on the floor level until the collapse of the fixed regime is actually 
materialized. Even under this uncertainty of attack timing, which is related to the
12
market’s imperfect information on the reserve floor, the fact that collapse is predictable 
(i.e., its nature of demise) is still effective and is an essence o f the first generation 
models, given government policy of expansionary domestic credit creation.
Third, the time of regime transition is determined at a certain time point where the 
shadow floating exchange rate is equal to or greater than the existing fixed exchange rate. 
The shadow exchange rate reflects market fundamentals after the crisis period, and so it 
would clear the foreign exchange market when foreign reserves reach the critical floor 
level. Speculators will make profits fi'om buying a central bank’s foreign reserves when 
the shadow rates exceed the fixed rates. Thus, an attack equilibrium arises fi'om the 
speculators’ competition for such opportunities of benefits fi'om the attacks.
Fourth, the first generation models produce a crisis as soon as there is a successful 
speculative attack. This rules out multiple equilibria through the process of backward 
induction coming fi'om the speculators’ competition for the profits.
The earlier works of first generation models focused on the money market under 
simplified assumptions, such as full employment and purchasing power parity (PPP). 
These models have been extended to several directions in order to illustrate better real 
economic phenomena like deviation firom PPP, uncertainty about domestic policies, and 
investors' portfolio behavior, and so on.* In the next section, several models are 
presented to show the characteristics of the first generation models.
® Goldberg (1988,1991,1994), including myself, studied this relaxation of the PPP assiunption that allows 
pre-attack fiscal expansions to be accompanied by increasingly overvalued real ourency and murent 
accoimt deficits. The assumption of the deviation from PPP also better reflects the real side of economy, 
for example, by probable formation expected future exchange rate development by distinguishing between 
actual and equilibriiun prices or exchmige rates. Flood and Garber (1984b) and Claessens (1991) show 
how the balance of payments crisis models are incorporated under the assumption of tlie maricet’s 
uncertainty about monetary and fiscal policies. Under this imcertainty, the rate of reserve depletion 
increases due to faster growing shadow exchange rates. Penati and Pennacchi (1989) extend earlier 
speculative attack models by deriving agents’ optimal consumption and portfolio decisions from a
13
Salant and Henderson (1978)
The basic idea in the study of collapse models is originated by Salant and 
Henderson’s (1978) application of the Hotelling (1931) model. Salant and Henderson 
show that the government’s attempt to fix the price of gold leads to speculative attacks on 
the stock of the gold and results in the depletion o f all o f the government reserves. 
Furthermore, Salant (1983) considers government price stabilization schemes with a 
fixed commodity price by using a buffer stock of that commodity. He also shows that 
speculative attack would occur as soon as government reserves fall below the smallest 
government stock below which level government can not support the fixed price. In 
other words, whenever the official price of the commodity is exceeded by the present 
discounted market value, the attack must take place, reflecting the expected profits by the 
commodity holders. The model illustrates that the government realizes the exhaustion of 
its stock with continuous attempts to stabilize the official price.
Krugman 11979)
The basic fi’amework o f Salant and Henderson (1978) was extended to the literature 
on the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime (or balance of payments crisis) by 
Krugman (1979) in which he considers the assumptions such as one product, two assets, 
perfect foresight, law of one price, and fully flexible wages and prices.
Krugman (1979) views that the leading force of speculative attack is originated 
fi'om the fondamental inconsistency between the government fiscal policy and the
monetary intertemporal capital asset pricing model, in which agents are allowed to rebalance their portfolio 
before attack, resulting in accelerated losses of central bank reserves by investors’ hedge against a currency 
crisis.
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government attempt at sustaining a fixed exchange rate system. That is, any attempt to 
maintain the fixed exchange rate regime, faced with increasing domestic credit due to 
financing government budget, results in gradual reduction in the central bank’s 
international reserves. Under this circumstance, investors expect a future depreciation of 
a domestic currency and thus government reserves would be exhausted by the consequent 
speculative attack, ending with a floating exchange rate. Thus, this view stresses that if a 
country abandons a currency peg when central bank foreign reserves reach a threshold 
level, that country is confi'onted with the inevitable balance-of-payments crisis due to 
continuous speculative attacks. The importance of Krugman’s (1979) study is to show 
the systematic mechanism o f a currency crisis occurring when a central bank tries to 
defend a currency peg with finite reserves. However, there also exist some limitations in 
the model such as the assumption of perfect foresight on the part of speculators, the lack 
of restrictive equilibrium^, and the ignorance of the policy options available to 
authorities.
Connolly and Taylor (1984)
Connolly and Taylor (1984) modified Krugman’s (1979) model of balance-of- 
payments crisis in order to find the exact time of a regime collapse by using a simple 
calculation. They consider the effect of collapse on the relative price of traded goods and 
the effect of one time shock to expenditures on the fixed exchange rate regime. They 
show that the collapse time is positively correlated with the growth rate of domestic 
credit and negatively correlated with the level o f reserves.
® These properties lead to an immediate collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime.
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Flood and Garber ('1884b')
Two extensions o f Krugman (1979) model by Flood and Garber (1984b) allow for 
a solution for the exact collapse timing using a linear model with or without the market’s 
speculative behavior. The first model, the continuous time model with perfect foresight, 
illustrates the inverse time paths between reserves and domestic credit with a constant 
money supply, prior to collapse. When monetary base equals domestic credit (i.e., total 
exhaustion of reserves), the fixed exchange rate shifts to a floating rate. Since a 
speculative attack is not involved in this transition (i.e., the collapse o f fixed regime is 
purely based on the market fundamentals not on the abrupt attacks), the model does not 
produce discrete jump in the exchange rate.
The second model, set in a discrete time with uncertainty (or stochastic version), 
allows for the exact calculation of collapse probability under the presence of the larger 
values of shadow exchange rates than the values of the fixed rates. The model includes 
stochastic terms in the domestic credit creation, which provides uncertainty about the 
collapse time for the speculators. The importance of their model is to show how to derive 
a collapse probability using observable variables. One of the weaknesses o f the model is, 
however, no possibility of devaluation. That is, government has no flexibility in its 
policy, except for being faced with regime collapse (i.e., there is no optimizing 
specification of a government policy), before depletion of international reserves with or 
without speculative attacks.
Shadow exchange rate is defined as a floating rate that would prevail at time t-^1 if  a collapse is 
materialized at period t+1.
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Obstfeld (1984^
Obstfeld (1984) extends the first model (i.e., non-stochastic version) developed by 
Flood and Garber (1984b) by showing the possibility o f devaluation rather than a fixed 
regime collapse. To show this possibility, he considers the central bank’s withdrawal 
from the intervention in the foreign exchange market when the international reserves 
reach a critical level. In addition, he considers the assumptions of speculators’ certainty 
about the time interval o f the transitional period during which a peg is allowed to float, 
about a new fixed rate after that transition, and about the threshold level of reserves.
He also shows that, under these assumptions, the timing of the speculative attack 
would be affected by the anticipated post attack policies by the speculators. And he 
illustrates that during the transitional period (i.e., after devaluation) the time path of 
capital flows is related to the monetary authority’s success in choosing a realistic 
exchange rate and in adopting appropriately restrictive macroeconomic policies.
Obstfeld ri986al
Obstfeld (1986a) analyzes inevitable transition between a fixed and a floating rate 
regime in a balance of payments model with explicit specification of individual 
intertemporal preference in which an individual receives transfers from a government and 
chooses between domestic money, domestic bonds, and foreign bonds.
In the model, he shows that central bank reserves can become inevitably negative 
with no violation of the government intertemporal constant. That is, a government can 
avoid a collapse when the reserves are supplemented through borrowing indefinitely from 
abroad, and as long as it raises taxes to service its debt. Since there needs no lower
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bound on a central bank’s foreign reserves, the linkage between threshold level in 
reserves (and so time of regime switch) and the size of currency devaluation weakens.
Thus, his study implies that the analogy between reserve path and the path of an 
exhaustible resource (e.g., gold in the study o f Salant and Henderson (1978)) becomes 
vague, under the conditions in which the private sector can have access to the world 
capital market or the government can borrow through the official route. However, there 
exists a possibility of a collapse when the country’s access to the world capital market is 
rationed.
Following Flood and Garber’s (1984b) discrete time model with uncertainty, 
several studies have shown the predicted probability of collapse of a fixed exchange rate 
system by performing empirical tests.
van Wiinbergen (1988^
van Wijnbergen (1988) considers the sustainability o f the transition from a flexible 
to a fixed exchange rate as part of the effort to control high inflation in Brazil, Argentina 
and Israel. Using Flood and Garber’s speculative model, van Wijnbergen illustrates the 
linkage between inconsistent policy measures and their post-collapse inflationary 
consequences.
Blanco and Garber 119861
Blanco and Garber (1986) attempt to model the devaluation o f the Mexican peso 
from 1973 to 1982, estimating the logarithmic version of Flood and Garber’s (1984b) 
model. They estimate a time series of one-step ahead probability that the shadow
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exchange rate would exceed the fixed rate in the next period. The results show that 
devaluation did occur when the shadow floating rate exceeds the fixed rate, and the 
devaluation probabilities peak prior to real major devaluation. Even though their 
empirical results are encouraging, they tested for only one country, and the method they 
used needs a certain condition such as the presence of a future currency market which is, 
in fact, rarely developed in many countries with fixed exchange rate systems.
In addition, as shown in Goldberg (1991), if some variables which could have 
affected the collapse probability had been omitted, their results would have been under- 
or-overestimated as follows: underestimated to the extent that prices and external credit 
supplies exhibit short-term randomness; overestimated to the extent that there are non­
traded goods in the domestic consumption, positive and significant risk premium, 
systematic deviation fi'om purchasing power parity and currency substitution motives 
influencing the demand for real balances. More importantly, as studied in Flood, Garber 
and Kramer (1996), the usual monetary model of speculative attack is inappropriate to 
demonstrate even a temporarily viable fixed exchange rate regime.
Goldberg ( 1994)
Goldberg extended the Flood and Garber (1984b) model to overcome Blanco and 
Garber’s (1986) incorrect estimations of the empirical works by adding some variables 
into the money demand equation. The real income, the expected rate of devaluation 
(considered as currency substitution) , and three random disturbances were added into the 
money demand function. Three random components are divided into the short-term price
” This is the case without modeling sterilization. This will be explained in detail in the next chapter.
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shock and two disturbances to the domestic credit expansion. The first component from 
the last two disturbances is the uncertain government revenue or unexpected government 
expenditure which affects the monetization to finance fiscal deficits. The second shock is 
the random and uncertain availability of external credit inflows, which makes uncertain 
the share of government deficits to be financed by external borrowing instead o f 
inflationary finance. The empirical tests produce relatively successful results o f 
forecasting the probabilities of the peso crisis between 1980 and 1986. According to 
those results, the currency speculation would have been sharply reduced by increasing the 
uncertainty surrounding domestic credit creation and the frequency of currency 
realignments, and by decreasing domestic credit growth and the size of currency 
realignments. In Goldberg (1994), monetary and fiscal polices are more important 
factors in triggering speculative attacks on the Mexican peso, than anticipated external 
credit shocks.
Melick 119961
Melick (1996) applies a speculative attack model of exchange rate crisis to the 
Mexican peso including the most recent events in 1994. Although his empirical findings 
are not quite satisfactory due to some reasons, the major contribution is a derivation of 
maximum likelihood estimators for the model. According to Melick (1996), the 
disappointing empirical results may stem from the highly stylized model and the nature 
of the Mexican experience such as political instability around 1994. Furthermore, Melick
’■ The first reason is that reduced form estimates are inconsistent with the theoretical assumption. And the 
second reason is that the forecasted probabilities of collapse are not consistent with the actual major 
devaluation.
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(1996) argues that a question might be raised whether the standard speculative attack 
model could be applicable to the recent Mexican crisis. This was due to the following 
several weaknesses o f standard models^^ such as the common assumptions of government 
fiscal deficits, no sterilization, the reserve losses at the time of collapse, inappropriate 
measure o f domestic credit resulting fi'om the standard log-linear speculative attack 
model, and the omission of some elements like a weakened banking sector and the 
political instability. Melick (1996), therefore, concludes that more applicability o f 
standard speculative models is guaranteed in the economy which is experiencing the 
unsustainable fiscal position, like Mexico in the 1980s.
Otker and PazarbaSioqIu (19971
Based on the monetary model of speculative attacks, Otker and Pazarbafioglu
(1997) attempt to estimate the contribution of economic fimdamentals to the exchange 
market pressures of EMS members in 1992-93. Using a probit model, they estimate one- 
step-ahead probability o f regime changes in the six sample countries, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Ireland, Italy, and Spain. Their empirical results show that in the cases of 
Belgium, Ireland, Italy, and Spain, the speculative pressure and observed exchange rate 
regime changes stemmed fi-om the inconsistency between the aggravating economic 
fundamentals such as domestic credit expansions and increasing government deficits and 
the existing exchange rate systems. For Denmark and France, the episodes of speculative 
attack pressure seem not to be originated by the deteriorating economic fundamentals.
That is, the simple monetary models of exchange rate determination.
" Previous studies, including Conolly and Taylor (1984), Blanco and Garber (1986), Goldberg (1988, 
1994), van Wijnbergen (1988), and Cumby and van Wijnbergen (1989), focused on the period of 1980s.
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rather by other factors which are not captured by their monetary model. Their results 
imply that the ERM crises were involved in both fondamental and speculation (i.e., self- 
folfilling) factors, though they give more weight on the fondamental view.
2.3 Second Generation Models
Although first generation models provide appropriate solutions for understanding 
the currency crises that took place in Mexico and Argentina between the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, the emergence of the ERM and Mexican crises in early 1990s has shifted 
researcher’ attention in a different direction in order to capture the characteristics of those 
crises. This was so because some EMS countries and Mexico were considered to 
experience the currency crises under conditions such as no constraint of borrowing 
international reserves, no monetary excesses, low inflation, and without increasing 
current account deficits. The contrary of the above features was found in the earlier 
Mexico and Argentina crises in the 1980s. Thus, the development of a subsequent 
generation of theoretical models (so-called second generation models of speculative 
attacks) has been proposed with the different assumptions and predictions from those of 
first generation models.
Second generation models attempt to examine the regime collapse caused by 
speculative attacks in terms of the macroeconomic fundamentals as in first generation 
models, but the models further consider that the fimdamentals are susceptible to changes 
in private expectations about the government policies. That is, if market participants 
have some information on the government policies that attempt to stabilize output, 
employment, and banking system, etc. at the expense o f the currency peg, faced with
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worsening domestic conditions, they anticipate the inevitable regime transition. And 
then, they attack the currency without evidence of deteriorating fimdamentals such as 
high inflation, growing current account deficits, monetary excesses, continuously 
increasing overvaluation.
Therefore, according to the proponents of this view, a currency crisis (in which the 
driving force is arbitrary shifts in the private sector’s expectation) can occur even when 
macroeconomic policies are consistent with the long-term fixed exchange rate policy. In 
other words, when the private sector anticipates the government policy change owing to 
their successful attacks, the possibility of multiple equilibria arises. Therefore, the 
exchange rate regime is not related to the current fundamentals and future fimdamentals 
with no attacks, but to the anticipated future fundamentals accompanied by attacks. 
Thus, these models generate multiple equilibria in the following manner; one equilibrium 
with no attack and no changes in fundamentals (i.e., permanent fixed exchange rate 
regime); the other equilibrium with attacks and changes in fundamentals (i.e., regime 
switch) which attacks thus, become self-fulfilling by causing the regime collapse.
One contribution of second generation models for capturing recent currency crises 
is that the models are well designed to consider the previously neglected features. These 
features include social-political issues (which may lead to a change in the market’s 
expectation) as well as macroeconomic fundamentals (which are focused on the first 
generation models).
More recent studies that still possess the nature of self-fulfilling and multiple 
equilibria have been extended to several directions in order to consider currency crises in 
the context of fixed exchange rate regimes with contagious effects, an escape clause, and
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herding behavior, and so forth.^^ The following section also describes the features of 
these extended models.
Obstfeld fl986bl
Obstfeld (1986b) modified the second model of Flood and Garber (1984b) with an 
assumption of relaxation of constant domestic credit growth which gives a possibility of 
self-fiilfilling crisis. He shows that a collapse can arise from the changes in the agent 
expectation on the government policy. That is, a collapse could be self-fulfilling because 
the driving force of the collapse is not the government domestic credit policy in a fixed 
rate regime but it is the agents’ knowledge that the domestic credit policy adopted by the 
government would be changed in the event of a collapse.
Obstfeld (1994)
Questions about the underlying causes of currency crises were raised from the 
turmoil of some EMS members in 1992-93.
Obstfeld (1994) gives a doubt whether the ERM currency experience could be 
properly understood in terms of classical theory of currency crises, a la Krugman (1979), 
because some European countries under the speculative pressures on their currency pegs 
had enough foreign reserves. Furthermore, their macroeconomic policies were not 
obviously inconsistent with the stability of their currencies against the Deutsche mark.
He considers that many other factors such as the effects of high interest rates and 
growing unemployment could be main sources in determining how different governments
These include Obstfeld (1996), Flood and Marion (1997), Goldfajn and Valdes (I997a,b ), Jeanne 
(1997), Sachs, etal. (1996),etc.
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responded to the 1992-93 ERM currency turbulence. Obstfeld (1994) provides two 
models which show that the crisis stems from the reciprocal behavior between rational 
private economic actors (or rational market participants) and a government running well- 
defined policy goals. The first model that is based on the effects o f high interest rates on 
the government fiscal position provides a possibility of multiple equilibria. This is so 
because a different set of private expectations (rather than the interaction of high nominal 
interest rates and market’s devaluation expectation) would have prevented the 
government from abandoning the fixed exchange regime.
The second model, based on the close economy models by Barro and Gorden 
(1983) and Kydland and Prescott (1977), also presents multiple equilibria caused by the 
shift in the market’s expectation on the government policy. Although the government’s 
attempt to alleviate the negative output shocks to competitiveness and employment is the 
original source of a devaluation, a sudden change in the private expectation on the 
government policy, such as its desire to permit a high rate of unemployment, also can 
trigger a devaluation that would not take place under another set o f market expectations.
Cole and Kehoe ri9961
Cole and Kehoe (1996) attempt to show that a debt crisis can arise from a self- 
fulfilling feature under a certain condition of the government debt, called a crisis zone. A 
self-fulfilling debt crisis is dependent on the realization of a sunspot variable which is a 
random variable of the model not related to the fimdamentals. For some initial values of 
government debt, a crisis takes place when the debt laid inside o f a crucial interval (called
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a crisis zone) is combined with an unfavorable realization o f the sunspot variable. On the 
contrary, a crisis does not occur when the realization of the sunspot variable is favorable.
When their model is applied to the Mexican debt crisis in 1994, they find that the 
size of the crisis zone relies on the average length of maturity of the government debt. 
Their result shows that the crisis zone in which a crisis can occur is above 10 percent in 
the ratio of debt to GDP. They attribute this low ratio to the very short average maturity 
o f the Mexican government’s debt, which was most 200 days in December 1994.
They further show that when a crisis is taking place, the government’s effort to 
change the maturity of debt is invalid because it is too late, and thus resulting in the 
inevitable crisis. Another source that can render multiple equilibria can stem from the 
different result under the equal economic fundamentals; for example, reputation.
Eichengreen. Rose, and Wvplosz (1996)
Another issue which is related to the self-fulfilling speculative attacks has been 
proposed as a subject of discussion in the literature of currency crisis in the wave of 
recent Mexican turmoil. Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) stress that self- 
fulfilling speculative attacks may have contagious effects on other currencies. They set 
up an index of exchange market pressure and estimate a binary probit model using the 
index in order to test the existence of contagious currency crises which are not believed 
to stem fi'om the domestic fundamentals such as money and output, but from the 
existence of speculative attacks in the rest of the world. Using quarterly macroeconomic 
and political data of 20 industrial countries from 1959 to 1993, they find that a 
speculative attack elsewhere in the world increases the probability of a domestic currency
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crisis by about 8 percent, even after controlling for domestic economic and political 
factors.
Even though their work can be regarded as a first step showing the contagious 
effects on the currency crisis, it rules out the importance of a country’s macroeconomic 
and/or trade policies because those policies would have changed the degree of contagious 
effect (which can be another source of triggering speculative attack in the neighboring 
country) by affecting the economic fundamentals of the neighboring country.
Gerlach and Smets ri995)
One of first systematic theoretical treatments analyzing contagious speculative 
attacks is the study by Gerlach and Smets (1995). They extend a two-country version of 
the model developed by Flood and Garber (1984b) and show how the collapse o f the 
Finnish markka in 1992 made an impact on the subsequent attack on the Swedish krona.
The contagious transmission stems from two channels in their model. First, the 
contagion comes from the real economy side, like trade of merchandise under the 
condition of sticky money wages. A devaluation of country A ’s currency caused by a 
speculative attack improves the competitiveness of country ^ ’s goods exports. This leads 
to a trade deficit as well as a gradual depletion of foreign reserves in country B, and thus 
finally resulting in a speculative attack on country 5 ’s currency.
The second channel of contagious effect stems from the lowered consumer price in 
country B. That is, with an appreciation of country B's currency led by the weak 
currency value in country country B is faced with lower import prices and thus with 
further deflated money stock due to a lower overall price level. This decrease in the
27
demand for domestic money leads to a fall in the international reserves because of the 
predetermined domestic credit. Thus, the above mechanism of declining reserves may 
shift country B ’s economy to an attack equilibrium from a no-attack equilibrium, and 
otherwise the currency peg o f country B  could have survived.
The importance o f this paper is to show how a country’s devaluation caused by a 
successful speculative attack can give rise to another speculative attack in the 
neighboring country by deteriorating its economic fundamentals. However, as pointed 
out by Buiter et al. (1998), the Gerlach and Smets’s (1995) study seems to be confined in 
an analytical framework for the country case in which the countries have balanced (or 
similar) economic environments.
Buiter, Corsetti and Pesenti (19981
To understand the root of ERM currency crises in 1992-93, Buiter, Corsetti and 
Pesenti (1998) use an escape clause model of exchange rate policy which, unlike previous 
studies based on the unilateral peg, emphasizes the structural policy spillovers among 
EMS countries and stresses the effects of coordination of monetary and exchange rate 
policies within the system. In a framework of N-^1 countries, N  countries called “the 
periphery” of the system peg their currencies to the last one (defined as “the center”). In 
model, the center is unwilling to coordinate its monetary policy with the periphery, while 
the periphery countries are allowed to cooperate among themselves.
Faced with a shock to the center country’s fundamentals (i.e., higher interest rates 
than the periphery, which is caused by the inflationary consequence of the internal 
boom), the periphery countries are under certain circumstances (i.e., whether they
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cooperate to remain in the system or to leave the system) since their pegs are required to 
be adjusted by the shock. A contagion may arise from all the periphery members’ 
decisions to leave the system. However, a smaller scale contagion occurs when not all 
the members of the periphery opt out of the system. In this case, the currency pegs o f the 
remaining members in the system can be stabilized by changing the center’s policy 
toward the loose monetary stance because the center now recognizes that its currency is 
overvalued. Thus, this change in the monetary stance o f the center can alleviate the 
pressure on the currencies o f the remaining periphery countries.
The center-periphery model shows that the adverse macroeconomic shock to the 
center can break the exchange rate regimes of the periphery, and also shows that the 
results of different reactions to the center’s macroeconomic shock may give rise to the 
selective contagion in the periphery.
Calvo and Mendoza (19971
The idea of herding behavior may in part explain the recent Korean financial crisis. 
Calvo and Mendoza (1997) consider global investors who react more to market rumors 
than to economic fundamentals. Under the conditions of a growing global financial 
market and incomplete information on it, portfolio diversification made by investors 
requires more fixed cost to collect information on a specific market. Therefore, they 
rely more on the market rumors and thus, they move in herds. That is, fund managers’
A higher interest rate in the center country leads to capital flows firom the periphery to the center. This 
leads to depreciation of the periphery currencies against the center if  the periphery members do not take 
steps about the drop in the demand for their domestic currencies.
This result is equal to the case o f unilateral peg in that the periphery members behave symmetrically as if 
they were a single currency area vis-à-vis the center.
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attitudes toward the assessment on their performances make them invest in the same 
portfolio without discrediting the rumors, even though the market’s fundamentals do not 
warrant further profit from those investments. Thus, this line of herding behavior can 
produce multiple equilibria such that the economy move from no-attack to the attack 
equilibrium.
As mentioned in Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998), the herding may in part give 
some idea as to why an asset bubble exists for a long period in emerging markets that 
face with weak economic fundamentals. In addition it may also explain why the 
magnitude of the bubble burst is larger (than it would have been) in the face of a reversal 
of market estimation on the bad economic fundamentals.
2.4 The Models on the Asian Currency Crisis 
Corsetti. Pesenti and Roubini ('1998)
Using a similar concept to the center-periphery model as in Buiter, Corsetti and 
Pesenti (1998) (which is used to explain the 1992-93 ERM crises), Corsetti, Pesenti and 
Roubini (1998) analyze the meltdown of some Asian currencies in 1997.
They show how the economies of the periphery countries are influenced by an 
economic shock to one periphery (e.g., a devaluation by this periphery country against 
the center coun t r y ) .Th i s  devaluation ultimately leads to an increase in this periphery’s 
output and so causes consequent devaluations in the rest of periphery countries since
The authors assume no intra-trade among the periphery countries. The periphery is allowed to trade with 
the center. In their model, one periphery country hit by first shock is assumed to be Thailand because the 
Asian crisis was originated in Thailand. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea are assumed to be the other 
periphery coimtries.
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they attempt to avoid any gap in cost-competitiveness and to maintain their existing 
shares in the center country. In other words, when one periphery gets a blow from a 
shock leading a devaluation in its currency, the other periphery countries ultimately 
follow the way as the one periphery did, and thus end with a competitive devaluation that 
stems from the structural links (in trade) across countries.
Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998) stress that the resulting Nash equilibrium of 
such a non-cooperative game among the peripheries requires much more cost than in a 
case of a cooperative equilibrium. That is, a coordinated realignment against the center 
would have produced much smaller cumulative devaluation in the periphery countries.
Krugman (19981
Another view concerned with the origin o f the Asian crises is suggested by 
Krugman (1998). His view does not rely on the first generation models which focus on 
bad economic fundamentals nor on the second generation models where crises are 
brought on by self-fulfilling prophecy. Instead, the view relies on the financial excess by 
the moral hazard problem (which leads to an asset bubble) and on the financial collapse 
(which is caused by the burst of the bubble).
Krugman (1998) argues that domestic financial conditions of the troubled Asian 
countries were distorted by financial intermediaries that excessively borrowed from 
ab roadunder  the implicit government guarantee o f bail-out and lent excessively to 
uncertain (or risky) investment projects. This excess domestic investment, which stems
In the 1990s, the bank lending in many Asian countries substantially increased. The ratio of bank 
lending to GDP expanded up to 50% in Thailand and Philippines, by 27% in Malaysia, about 15% in Korea 
and Indonesia. If non-banking institutions were contained to the financial intermediaries, the ratio would 
have had a further increase.
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from the moral hazard problem both in the financial intermediaries and the government, 
leads to inflation in the asset prices. That is, the overestimated value of the risky assets 
was gradually increasing due to the continuous guaranteed foreign borrowing, resulting in 
market’s continuous misinterpretation of the financial condition of those intermediaries 
(i.e., overestimation o f the assets). Under this circumstance, when the asset bubble 
bursts, the asset prices begin to fall and the falling rate speeds up as the intermediaries 
have no further access to the foreign credit markets due to the previous blast of the asset 
bubble.
BCrugman (1998) further points out that this circular mechanism of asset values may 
provide some implications about the features of Asian episodes such as the contagion 
effect^® among Asian economies, an effect which may stem from a self-fiilfilling crisis in 
an economy due to the above bubble-burst cycle in the asset prices.
Radeletand Sachs fl998)
Radelet and Sachs (1998) emphasize the importance of financial panic as a driving 
force in triggering the Asian financial crises. With such reasons as continuously 
increasing capital inflows prior to crisis period^^, major indicators showing sound 
economic fundamentals in that region through the 1990s, and sound economic conditions 
in the world market (unlike the time of Latin American crises in 1970s-1980s), they 
regard the Asian crisis as a problem of financial panic, rather than a problem of economic
Many Korean financial institutions, in fact, had been involved in the turmoil of the southeast Asian crises 
even before the Korean currency crisis because they invested substantially in those countries.
Such surge in capital inflows in to this region through the 1990s is based on the following reasons. First, 
capital market liberalization in developed countries allows much more investment to the emerging markets, 
including this region. Second, low interest rates in the U.S. and Japan made the investors’ attention turn 
toward the Asian countries. Third, foreign creditors’ optimism on the continuing high economic growth of 
this regioiL Finally, financial deregulation of Asian countries also made the capital inflows easier.
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fundamentals. They also attempt to trace the origin o f the crisis from the financial panic 
on the basis of the market’s non-anticipation of the crisis (which might stem from the 
above economic condition of the region) and on the basis o f the credit rating agencies’ 
(e.g.. Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s) ongoing assessment of credit risk in the 
emerging markets.
According to Radelet and Sachs (1998), due to the above interpretation of 
economic circumstance prior to the crisis, the early warning signals did not operate, 
although some macroeconomic fundamentals became unfavorable to the region. 
However, once a crisis took place in Thailand, the contagious effect was quickly 
transmitted to the countries in that region under the existing potential weaknesses in the 
fundamentals and in the financial markets. This contagion, then, rapidly spread out, 
gearing with the withdrawal of foreign investments.
Radelet and Sachs (1998) share with Corsetti et a/.’ (1998) view that the worst 
outcome of the Asian crisis could have been avoided, not by using the concept of 
cooperative game among the countries in that region suggested by Corsetti et a/.(I998), 
but by conducting relatively moderate adjustments and appropriate policy changes in 
each country.^^ Their view of triggering the crisis is also different from Krugman (1998) 
(in which onset of the crisis is attributed to the bubble-burst cycle due to the moral hazard 
problem) in that they stress the importance of financial panic coming from the shift in the 
market’s attitude toward its investment in that region.
This yields multiple equilibria because allowing the policy changes and adjustments would provide better 
outcome compared to a crisis.
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2.5 Conclusion
Previous sections briefly describe some features o f  two different generation models 
of currency crises, in which the models illustrate the main causes of a currency crisis that 
took place in different regions and periods. However, no model could provide an 
appropriate solution for understanding all the crises. A. certain model is in a favorable 
position in analyzing a certain crisis, but that model may be inferior to another one in 
examining another crisis. This fact seems to be true even in the same generation models 
because each model has its own view point and approach to a crisis, even though the 
models share the same theoretical base with the other models in the same category. For 
example, this nature has been found in the previous section’s studies suggested by Buiter 
et al. (1998), Corsetti et al. (1998), and Radelet and Sachs (1998). While the first two 
stress the importance of deteriorating economic fundamentals (e.g., the loss of 
competitiveness), the last model emphasizes the nature o f self-fulfilling prophecies (e.g., 
financial panic) to explain the Asian crisis.
I will analyze the Korean currency crisis from the view point of the first generation 
model by using a monetary model of exchange rate determination and by presenting 
some reasons to support this approach (i.e., deteriorating economic fundamentals). 
Furthermore, the model will be modified to allow for several characteristics of second 
generation models, such as a self-fulfilling speculative attack and/or contagious effects 
which may have played, in part, an important role in the onset of the Korean currency 
crisis in 1997.
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CHAPTER 3 
Theoretical Framework
3.1 Introduction
A model of collapse o f a fixed exchange rate regime adopted in this chapter 
extends the Goldberg (1991) and Flood, Garber and Kramer (1996) models of speculative 
attack, which are modified versions of the Flood and Garber (1984b) model. The basic 
assumptions of the Flood and Garber (1984b) model are retained in the model of this 
chapter: (1) a discrete-time model with uncertainty; (2) an emphasis on the money market 
equilibrium condition; and (3) an assumption of a small open economy. However, the 
model presented in this chapter departs from the standard first-generation models of 
exchange rate crisis, such as Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984b) in several 
ways.^
The first departure is that the model allows deviation from purchasing power 
parity (PPP). This deviation is separated into two factors, systematic (i.e., long-run) and 
random (i.e., short-run) components. The nonrandom (or systematic) deviation from 
purchasing power parity, considered as long-run phenomenon, had been found in Korea 
as well as in the troubled Asian economies long before the currency crises occurred in 
that region. That is, most of the troubled Asian countries experienced real depreciation in 
their currencies during 1991-1995 by pegging their currencies to the U.S. dollar since
^ Even though the model developed in this chapter has several departures, it could be said that the model is 
still based on the idea of first generation of speculative attack models since these departures come fi'om the 
need to illustrate deteriorating fimdamentals and to describe more realistic economic atmosphere.
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the U.S. dollar was weakened relative to Japanese yen and Deutsche mark during this 
period. However, after the middle of 1995, the Asian currencies experienced a large real 
appreciation because the U.S. dollar, with which Asian currencies were tied, began to be 
strong relative to the other major currencies. Thus, this departure from PPP needs to be 
contained in the model to reflect the real economic phenomena.
The second departure is an inclusion of the income in the money demand equation, 
which enables us to consider the real side of the economy to affect the probability of the 
collapsing exchange rate. The third departure is that the consumption bundle is 
decomposed into home and traded goods. This decomposition allows real exchange rates 
to change during a currency crisis.
The fourth departure is a separation of the random term in domestic credit creation 
into two components. The additional term is an uncertain access to supplies of external 
credit for the troubled economy. This indicates that domestic credit expansion is 
impacted by the external shock as well as by the internal factor (i.e., monetary financing 
of government deficits). Although the government budget deficit in Korea was almost 
balanced before the crisis period, unexpected government expenditure (i.e., internal 
shock) is included in the model to reflect the government current or future fiscal deficit 
which may come from the financing of non-performing loans in the banking system that 
in part resulted from the government implicit and/or explicit bailout. Furthermore, the 
capital inflows to Korea became significantly restrictive around the currency crisis period 
by the effect of southeast Asian crises. If access to external credit had not been limited 
(i.e., external shock < 0), the probability of the regime collapse would have sharply
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decreased. In this context, the inclusion of these shocks plays an important role in 
formulating the model.
This chapter also introduces the role of sterilization operation by the central bank. 
The sterilization policy was actually adopted by the Korean monetary authorities^'^ 
around the crisis period in 1997 as well as in Mexico in 1994-1995.^^ That is, as shown 
in figure 3.1, the Korean monetary authorities sterilized the fall in reserves at the time of 
the attack (i.e., in 4*^  quarter of 1997) as well as prior to attack period.
Figure 3.1: Dom estic Credit and International Reserves
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In the presence of speculative attacks, as analyzed by Corsetti, et al. (1998), the Korean monetary 
authorities reacted against speculative attacks by taking steps such as a sterilization policy for the reserve 
losses and a stable interest rate policy. They might have adopted these policies in order to avoid a 
slowdown in the economic activity (which was against the highly growth-oriented policy for several 
decades in Korea) due to sharply increased interest rates and to avoid bankruptcies of many firms and 
financial intermediaries due to a monetary contraction (and so a credit squeeze).
^  See Flood, Garber and BCramer (1996) and GrifiSth-Jones (1997) for the studies that explain the 
sterilization policy at the time of the 1994 Mexican currency crisis.
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Therefore, the monetary base does not sharply drop at the time o f attack, unlike the 
assumption made in the standard speculative attack models where the reserve losses are 
assumed to be sterilized only before the attack period and thus the base money sharply 
drops during attack time. Thus, the standard speculative attack models (i.e., first 
generation models of fixed regime collapse) should be modified to have the sterilization 
effect on the money supply.
Since the sterilization operation is accomplished by the monetary authority’s open- 
market purchase of domestic government bonds from the private sector in the final 
attacks against domestic currency, it is necessary to introduce domestic government 
bonds held by the private sector into the currency crisis model. For the sterilization 
process, a monetary model o f balance of payments needs to be extended to the portfolio 
balance model of balance o f payment and exchange rate with assumption of imperfect 
asset substitutability. The approach used in this chapter is to follow Flood, Garber and 
ECramer (1996) which is a portfolio balance model o f Tobin’s (1971) version.
In addition to the above departures, the following three factors are introduced to the 
model in this chapter in order for the first generation models to be incorporated with 
second generation models by stressing the importance of speculative behavior.
The first factor is an addition of currency substitution motive into the money 
demand function. Introducing this term allows the model to capture the speculative 
activity of changing investors’ portfolio motives. In the presence of this term, money 
demand is reduced, and it also prevents an overestimation of monetary expansion that can 
be sustained without a collapse o f the exchange rate regime.
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Second, the ratio o f non-performing loans to total loans in the banking system is 
added to the money demand function. This additional factor could be considered as an 
indicator of government’s current or future fiscal deficits. Although most Asian 
countries experiencing economic crises showed low fiscal deficits prior to the crises, they 
held a magnificent amount of non-performing loans which may stem jfrom the implicit 
and/or explicit government’s bail out. This fact implies a serious burden on the current 
and/or fiiture fiscal balances for those governments o f the troubled economies. As long 
as market participants recognize this logic and they anticipate the monetization of such 
deficits, the ratio of non-performing loans could be considered as an indicator of future 
devaluations. Thus, this variable is negatively related to the money demand, implying the 
change in the market’s expectation on the domestic economic condition.
The third additional factor is a risk premium which is embedded in the interest 
parity condition. This time-varying stochastic risk premium may be another source of 
speculative attack and the attack then can be self-fulfilled. These self-fulfilling 
prophecies about exchange market risk can be induced in some range of fundamentals 
and thus provide multiple equilibria.
3.2 Description of the model
The theoretical framework is based on the following nine equations;
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Q ,= a P ,^ i \ - a ) P : s ,  (?)
|-= f ,'+ n ;  (4)
-  P t ^ ^ t  (5)
CD
A -  A-i ~^Pi O )
St=Yt-<i>t (8)
M \  = M f  (9)
Equation (1) represents the demand for real money balance, which is deflated by the 
domestic price level, Qt. The money demand equation is positively related to the income, 
yt, which is assumed to be an exogenous component, through transaction motives, and 
negatively related to the interest rate, 4  through portfolio motives. A currency 
substitution motive, (EtSt+i — S[)/St,^  ^ reduces the real money balance. This motive is 
expressed by the expected rate of domestic currency depreciation, (EtSt+i -  with 
negative sign of the coefficient a^. The ratio of non-performing loan to total loans in the 
banking system. N't, could be considered as a future fiscal burden of domestic 
govemment.^^ Thus, as this ratio increases, market participants will conceive that 
the domestic financial system will become more unstable, and so they will decrease their 
holdings of domestic currency. Therefore, the real money demand is reduced by this
26 St refers to the nominal exchange rate in terms of won/U.S. dollar. EpSi+r is expected exchange rate 
formed at time t.
This term was added into the money demand equation in the study of Gruben and Welch (1996).
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component. Although this ratio of non-performing loans may be also viewed as an 
opportunity for the currency substitution, like the expected rate of domestic currency 
depreciation component — ■Sy/S't)], it is essential to include this ratio in order to
understand the recent Asian currency crises.
Equation (2)^* stems from a convenient version o f Tobin’s (1971) portfolio balance 
model. When it is rearranged in terms of the domestic interest rate, we have the form of 
equation (2). The last term in equation (2) is introduced to explain the sterilization 
operation through the bond market. This term can also reflect the compensation for the 
market participants who want to invest in the riskier domestic assets. Thus, the last term 
also implies a bond-based risk premium on the domestic currency due to imperfect asset 
substitutability. Permitting this risk premium to vary period by period generates a 
nonlinearity in the market behavior, and thus this can provide multiple equilibria by 
changing attack time that comes from their maximization behavior which is reflected in 
the feedback relation among the interest rates, the money demand, and the variability in 
the exchange rate.
The domestic price is determined according to equation (3). The level of domestic 
price is a weighted sum of domestically produced goods price, Pf, and imported goods 
price converted to domestic currency, . Since the weight of non-traded goods, a, is
assumed to be given, there would be no expenditure switching or expenditure reducing 
considerations resulting from the exchange rate change. Equation (4) assumes that the
^ Equation (2) is derived in terms of q from 5 , - S^t' = df' { it-  it" -  SJ/SJS,P['w , 9 > 0 , where Ô 
is worldwide liquid real wealth and it is foreign interest rate, which are constants. 5 , is the stock of 
domestic currency denominated interest-paying debt issued by the domestic government and held in the 
private sector at home and abroad, and B, is analogous foreign magnitude.
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short-run purchasing power parity does not hold. This is done by introducing the 
additional variable, H ’, into the assumption of purchasing power parity condition, 
/  5, = P*. Equation (5) defines the pattern of movement in the deviation of purchasing 
power parity, which is divided into a systematic component, pt, and a random component, 
Of. The distribution of the random variable will be discussed later in this chapter in 
detail. Equation (6) defines the money supply as the sum of domestic credit, A , and 
foreign reserves, Pt, held by the central bank. Equation (7) gives the specification for the 
process of domestic credit creation, which is divided into three components; Dt.i  ^
domestic credit created in the previous period, pt, the trend ratio of domestic credit 
creation (which is manageable by domestic government (i.e., reflection of the expected 
trend growth rate of the credit to finance the government budget deficit)) and St, the 
variability o f the trend rate.
Equation (8) divides the variability of a trend rate in equation (7) into two random 
terms. The first source of variability, yt, reflects unexpected government expenditure to 
finance the budget deficit as well as random or uncertain government revenue. Ef there is 
unanticipated government expenditure or random revenue, the domestic credit will be 
unexpectedly created above its trend, pt- Therefore, this random term,/?, has a plus sign in 
equation (8). This shock is also assumed to be an independent random disturbance. The 
second disturbance of trend rate, , reflects uncertain or random access to the external
credit flows from rest of the world into the domestic economy.^^ The budget deficits of 
the domestic government would be further financed by printing money when this access
^ This comes from Harberger and Edwards (1982). This shock may be attributed to one of most important 
factors for understanding the recent Asian currency crises.
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to external credits is more constrained. If 0, then government will be able to use the
unexpected external credit to finance its deficits rather than using inflationary finance. 
0 indicates negative shocks to the availability o f the external capital market,
implying domestic credit creation above its trend, //t. The two components, therefore, 
can be regarded as orthogonal factors which offset in each other an increase (or a 
decrease) in the domestic credit creation. These shocks are assumed to be independently 
distributed and will be studied in more detail later in this chapter.
Equation (9) defines the condition for money market equilibrium. This equilibrium 
condition determines the movement of reserves under a fixed exchange rate system and 
the time path of the exchange rate under a flexible rate regime. Therefore, excess 
domestic credit will not change the exchange rate under the fixed rate system. Instead, 
this leads to a decrease in foreign reserves. On the contrary, if foreign reserves are not 
allowed to move when there is an excess supply of domestic credit, the exchange rate 
needs to be adjusted under a flexible exchange rate regime. The condition for money 
market equilibrium is, therefore, determined by an interaction of movements in foreign 
reserves, domestic credit, and the exchange rate.
3.3 Solution for the Shadow Floating Exchange Rate
When the exchange rate is fixed, the condition for money market equilibrium is 
retained, and we can rewrite this condition as follows:
(9)
R, +D, = M f  (10)
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To explicitly solve the right hand side of equation (10), we need to combine equation (I) 
through equation (4). Before doing this, we have to rewrite equation (2) in order to 
provide an explicit form of the bond-market implications of the central bank’s 
intervention. This intervention is to sterilize foreign reserve losses and to maintain a fixed 
exchange rate regime. Combining equation (3) and equation (4) gives
Substituting this Qt and equation (2) into the equation (I) yields 30
= ^0 +  -
Rewriting the above equation, we have
ao - a , f rr
- a . 'EtSt^ t -S, ■a^N,
( 11)
As analyzed in Flood, Garber and BZramer (1996), if the monetary authority fully sterilizes the reserve 
losses during the speculative attacks, the discrete falls in the monetary base can be eliminated, but the 
reserve losses do not remove the discrete adjustment from the money demand because of the shift in the 
domestic interest rate. To balance these jumps, the bond-market considerations should be introduced. 
Otherwise, the fixed exchange rate carmot survive even temporarily. With the bond markets in the model, 
we can equate money supply and money demand.
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To find the rate of reserve losses, the following assumptions need to be proposed. First, 
the rate of expected exchange rate depreciation as well as exchange rate depreciation 
itsellÇ are zero. This (i.e., (E^c+i - S/St) = 0) rules out the peso problem.^ ^  Second, the 
real exchange rate is fixed. Thus, A(P,/5',) =A (P/-t-orn ,) = 0, where A indicates the
time difference. Third, the real income (yt) is given, and the foreign interest rate (/*) and 
the rate of non-performing loans (Nt) are also considered as exogenous factors. Thus, 
A ( a Q - a / * - { - ( U i + a ^ ) ( E ^ S ^ ^ i - S J / S ^ ^  = 0. Fourth, B  (the stock of domestic
currency denominated interest-paying debt issued by the domestic government and held 
in the private sector at home and abroad) is constant but B* is not. B* moves the 
following pattern in terms o f the market with a constant initial level of B*, B *. That is, B* 
changes as follows:
(12)
where Ro is the initial level of reserves, and S  indicates a fixed exchange rate.^^ Taking 
first difference of equation (11) yields the time path of money supply under the above 
restrictions as follows:
'a,0(P* -^aD.')AD, +A/?, = -
P V
AR
y
As defined in Krasker (1980), the peso problem is a statistical problem in the tests for the efficiency and 
rationality of markets, and of forward exchange markets in particular. This sometimes invalidates the test 
procedures used by the previous studies in the sense that the true Type I error probability (the probability of 
rejecting the efficiency and rationality of the market when it is true) is larger than one is led to believe. This 
is sometimes called the peso problem since it was first suspected shortly before the Mexican peso 
devaluation in 1976.
Since R (foreign reserve) is expressed in the domestic currency, it needs to be converted to tlie foreign 
currency units by dividing the exchange rate.
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Since the change in the domestic credit creation is assumed to be retained at the rate of //f, 
the above equation becomes as follows:^^
//, +AR, = - 'a,d{P* +gÇÏ) AR (13)
This equation shows that the rate change in the domestic credit creation is not perfectly 
offset by that of reserve losses, reflected in the difference between the two rates (i.e., the 
term , ai6 (p* + cdPPyp*nr is not zero) during the fixed rate regime. Although the two 
rates do not show perfect inverse-movement, when one component decreases the 
monetary base does not sharply drop (unlike the assumption of the standard generation 
speculative attack models) during the attack time because of the central bank’s 
sterilization operation. Thus, this rate of foreign reserve losses can be applied during the 
speculative attacks.
When the exchange rate is variable, we can find the path of floating exchange rate 
by using equations (11) and (12), and this leads to an equilibrium condition followed by a 
successful attack with sterilization as follows:
/; + ^ + 4 bo - b , - s b ; +
y
+ a^yt -«3 (14)
The rate in the reserve change, therefore, is AR, = -{1/ [I- (ai Ô ( p'+aQ.’) /p'm)] }fj,. If m is sufBciently 
large so that {1/ [1- (oi 6 (p' + aD.' /p m)]} is close to one, AR  =  p , can be achieved.
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w here= (£ ,6 'j+ i —S^) and Rc + is the level o f monetary base after attack which is 
identical to the pre-attack level because it is sterilized by the exact amount o f reserve 
losses (p^ - D)?^ Thus, B  takes the form of iSBt (=  Bo —Bt) from the above equation to 
reflect the amount of sterilization during attack. We can, therefore, replace
+D^ and equate M f  . Rearranging the above equation gives
(15)
where a = aQ -a ,/*  + a ^6 ^l +{Rq - R p i I P * m . Here, let
P / + a  n j  = A and -  (a,GPg / + (a^  QB^  / P*rs) = C^.
Then equation (15) becomes
M"
~  — Cl+clSl—(a^+a^)Sc (16)
When the availability for the source of foreign reserve is limited by some reasons such as 
fundamental disequilibrium (i.e., a systematic decline of reserves stemming from 
prolonged currency overvaluation) or limited external credit inflows, the fixed exchange 
rate with continuous reserve losses (due to above reasons) in equation (16) would not be
Since foreign reserves is assumed to fall to a critical level (Rc) at the time of regime transition, Rc exists 
in the equation, unlike in Flood, Garber and Kramer (1996) where they assume zero reserves at the time of 
regime collapse. is the level of domestic credit during the attack, which is larger than the pre-attack D 
due to the sterilization of reserve losses.
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maintained, at which level of reserves the exchange rate is forced to change. Thus, 
equation (16) becomes
(17)
where is called the shadow exchange rate, following Flood and Garber (1984b), this
rate will clear the money market in period t+I when the rate is equal to or greater than 
the fixed rate in period t with expectation of agents’ profits fi'om speculative attacks in 
period t.
The method of undetermined coefficient is used to postulate the time path of the 
shadow floating rate. First, we need to posit the solution for in equation (17) as 
follows: =Ao-i-
When the reserves hit the critical level, Rc, the fixed exchange rate would float. The 
monetary base, however, would remain at the same level before collapse of the fixed 
exchange rate regime due to the sterilization operation by the central bank.
The solution for 6', is
(g, + ^ 3)^ 1,
Aa~ a
■ 1 ■+
_Aa_
Therefore, the derived coefificients are Xq = {a.i + /^<3T -  Ct /  a and 1/ = (1/^g),
respectively. Rearranging the above equation gives the following shadow floating rate:
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\a , -A a C , ^  ^
a
where, again, A = P*+oiÇÏ^, =-(a^OB^)l P'm-^-{a^dB^)f P'tir and
a - a ^ -  a,/* + a^ _y^  - +  a , + (/?o -  ) /  5"} / P*m , respectively. Replacing Mt
by using equation (7) and (8) and using Rc for the shadow rate, , and finally rewriting A 
and Ct for the original forms, we have the time path of as follows:
Three shocks exist in equation (18), and these shocks affect the speed o f . The positive 
relative price shock (fît > 0) makes the pressure on the exchange rate decrease by raising 
the money demand for transaction motives. The positive domestic government budget 
shock (Yf > 0) caused by the unanticipated expenditures and uncertain government 
revenues leads to an upward devaluation pressure by increasing the domestic credit 
creation, Di (also by increasing the money supply). If there are unexpected capital 
inflows to the crisis economy (i.e., positive external credit shocks, (J)^  > 0), the pressure
on the exchange rate would be alleviated by decreasing the need for domestic credit 
creation, and thus the money supply would also decrease. Even if domestic fiscal 
policies are in good shape, the pressure on the exchange rate could increase due to an
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abrupt restriction in the external capital inflow.^^ Furthermore, with large-prolonged 
systematic overvaluation, there could be an upward pressure on the shadow floating rate 
even with external credit inflows/^
3,4 Solution for the Probability of a Regime Collapse
When the shadow floating rate in period t exceeds the fixed (*?,) rate in
period r, we can obtain a knowledge of the collapse probability of a fixed exchange
rate regime, defined as follows:
= Pr-
O. + CC ) P, m a
If speculators anticipate the regime collapse in the next period by their attacks against the 
foreign reserves held by a central bank (i.e., if they expect 6"^ +, > S ), they may continue 
purchasing the reserves at price S  , reselling immediately in the beginning of period t+1 
at price 5,^,. With this sale, they would make a profit of ((5,^, - S  ) > 0 ) per unit of
In reality, troubled Asian economies were limited to the external capital access due to reluctance of roll­
over by the foreign financial institutions.
Asian crisis-coimtries have been experiencing large currency overvaluations, leading to magnificent 
current account imbalances. This, in fact, affects positive pressiu-e on the devaluation in these countries.
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reserves. If  < S , speculators would not buy the foreign reserves since they recognize 
that there will be no profits from these transactions of reserves.
3.4.1 Derivation of the Probability under Distributions of Random Disturbances
Three random components are found in equation (19), which are f l , , and (j),
First, it is crucial to set up the distributions of these disturbances in order to evaluate the
TTi, probability o f collapse.
Following Flood and Garber (1984b) and Goldberg (1994), the random 
components, Qf, jt and (j)^ , are assumed to be exponentially and independently distributed
with means adjusted to zero and variances o f (Y/w) ,^ (7/1/)^ and (7/%?)^ , respectively.^* 
The random component of the deviation from purchasing power parity is
Gj = ---+ ûJj (20)
w
where % is distributed with mean 1/w and density function is
_ Jw-exp[-w-ûjJ, i f  CO, >0 1
I 0,
The stochastic component of domestic credit creation by random revenue is
+ (21)
A
In equation (4), the only random shock is Q,, and the distribution mentioned here is about this 
component, not Dt term. The term, Q,' will be replaced with p  + to explicitly derive tt,, as below.
^ The reasons for the assumption of exponentM distribution are analytically convenient and intuitively 
appealing, when there are large positive shocks to domestic credit creation and to the other random 
disturbances.
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where vu is distributed with mean 1/Ài and the density function is
r -exp[ //v i, > 0  1
' I 0, iTV:, < 0 j
The random disturbance of domestic credit creation by access to external credit is
where V2 t is distributed with mean I/X 2  and the density function is 
r 2. exp[-Z ,v,J, i f  V,, > 0 1
- I 0,
Plugging equations (20), (21) and (22) into equation (19), and then rearranging so as for 
the random components to be collected at the same side, yields
(23)
In equation (20), (21) and (22), lAv, l/Xi and I/X2  are shift variables for the random disturbances to be 
distributed with zero means.
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When the right side (i.e., nonrandom components) and the left side terms (i.e., random 
components) in equation (23) are replaced by Kt+i and Zc+/, respectively, and then 
equation (23) is shortened as follows:
ÎT , =Pr{(&iar + C,a)<o,.,- V ,  , . ,
= Pr{Z„, < a:,., } (24)
To calculate the probability of collapse, equation (23) needs to be expressed as equation
(24) by using the joint probabilities of disturbances as seen below. The probability 
density ftmctions (pdfs) of the random variables X, Yi and Yj are
and so.
+ with
= l^.r+1 with p d f  =A.,+I
with p d f
=(Saa-h  C,+, a)  + v,
To derive the probability of collapse, the p d f  of Z must be first solved. The p d f o î Z  is
f , (Z) = Jf f ( X )  ■ f ( Y, ) ■ f ( Z  -  X + Y, ) dY, dX (26)
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Once we have the p d f  of Z, we know the probability that the shadow floating rate would 
exceed the fixed rate:
•A T ,
(27)
First, we need to solve equation (26) to have the explicit form of /%, with which we can 
calculate m fi'om equation (27).
Saa
dV^dX
So that
A (Z ) =
wA,/U 1
A.fA  ^ + / L ) _ Z, + ( w / 4^, )_
(28)
where Ai = Saa-^C^^^a and , respectively.
Integrating equation (28) gives the final solution for the probability o f collapse
(29)
wL,
Jjisaa + C,+,a)^ -i-w] [l,
where = + & - X ± - ( S a ^ C , „ X K ,  - ^ )a  A ^2 w J
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3.5 Movement of % along with the Change in Variables
Several variables affect the probability, rct, in equation (29). The probability o f  
collapse of the exchange rate system is a positive or negative function of such variables 
as the level of domestic income (yj, the risk premium, the share of non-traded goods (a), 
the rate of domestic credit creation (//J, the critical floor level of reserves (/^), the 
variance of relative prices (/Av), the variance of domestic credit creation (/Al/), the 
variability o f external credit inflows systematic deviation from purchasing power
parity (/9f), the rate of non-performing loans (7\Q, and the level of sterilization.
The probability of a collapse in period /+ /, computed in period t, rises as the 
domestic credit expands. This can be derived by differentiating equation (29) with 
respect to /Ut.
drr.t _
d‘K^
" (a  +  a ,  4 - a J
_[(5aûr +  Q ,û r )A , + w ][A, -t-A ,]j a
w A , U a  + a,
+  + w ][A , + A J a
A, >0
> 0
The sufficient conditions for the above two relations are a  > 0 and a^+aj > 0, 
respectively."^® These relationships can be figured in terms of rct against the trend rate of 
domestic credit creation.
40 The three shocks, ku Aj, and w, are assumed to be positive.
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Figure 3.2: Plot of the Collapse Probability of Fixed Regime against fit.
From figure 1, the probability of collapse becomes one at and above the level of p."
In region f  the probability o f collapse increases as pt approaches to p ' . Even when fit =
0, TCt remains at a level greater than zero. That is, if fit = 0, only (<z -t- <3 i + <23) fi/a term in 
Kt is eliminated and the non-exponential component is not removed, and thus rvt is not 
zero. This implies that while there is no fiscal deficit, the domestic credit could be 
created by random shocks such as unexpected government expenditure and unanticipated 
external credit shortage, and this leads to reserve losses even though the fit is zero.
The probability of collapse is also a function of the level of the reserve floor. 
Differentiating equation (28) with respect to Rc yields
■” This fact results from the assumption of the shape off/z). The p d f  off (z )  is assumed to be exponentially 
distributed with K t< 0  when tti is less than zero.
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dR^  \]isaa+c^^,a)\ +w][A, + A, ] _ >  0
The sufficient condition is or > 0. Although this level o f  the reserve floor is set by the 
monetary authority, the agents would not be informed before the collapse of the exchange 
rate regime. This uncertainty about the reserve floor would lead to a series of mini- 
speculative attacks on the central bank reserve stock. To evaluate this floor level, an 
econometric methodology will be introduced in the next chapter.
3.5.1 Elimination of the Collapse Probability
From the previous section we know that the probability of collapse is not eliminated 
even when fit = 0. Observing equation (29), the probability will become zero under 
several conditions.
First, lîK t goes to infinity (i.e., Kt -> the collapse will be removed. However, 
this condition is highly unlikely. In terms of domestic credit creation (jUt), this condition 
does not seem to be achievable, even if reducing the rate o f domestic credit creation (//r) 
lowers Kt, and so probability of collapse as seen in figure I, because even when fit = 0, % 
is greater than zero. Second, if A/ approaches to infinity (i.e., if 7/A/ Qif ,^ it is satisfied 
for TCt to be zero. This condition tells that if the public knows thoroughly the path of 
money growth, the threat of collapse would be removed; since //A; is the mean of the
Previously, K  is assumed to be negative when ;ç < 1.
Even when there is no assumption of Æi < 0, if 7/2; -> 0, then iCt approaches to zero because the non­
exponential term in equation (28) goes to zero under condition of A; ^  oo (=7/2; ->■ 0).
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exponentially distributed random money growth term, 1/Zi —> 0 implies that this random 
component becomes completely non-random.
Third, when I/X2  goes to infinity, the probability of collapse can be eliminated. 
This condition is, however, highly unlikely because (//At 00) means that the variability
of supplies of external credit should be infinity for the prevention of a collapse.
Fourth, if lAv 00 (i.e., if the short-run variability of deviation fi'om the purchasing 
power parity goes to zero), then there will be no collapse of a fixed regime. But this 
condition is also highly unlikely.
3.5.2 Comparative Statics
To analyze the changes in the probability of collapse associated with the movement 
in some variable in term a, we first need to differentiate 7Ct with respect to a. Then, taking 
the differentiate a with respect to a certain variable contained in a yields the following 
results.
^ < 0 , >fda a~
)*t+I
- S a> —
(Saa+C,^i)Â^
where a = a^ - a ,C , +a,y^^^ +a^0 {sj +(i?o - K ï S } / .
The sufficient conditions to satisfy ÔTCtlda < 0 are that /^%,+ apt+i > alw^, and
1(^ 1 I c r+  S  (Pi+i' + «A+/ > - S  a /  [(^S a a  +  Ct+i) Xi+w\ is different from the result
in Goldberg (1988).
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Next, differentiating a with respect to y  (real income) gives
, . da ^ , d7T,(a)  > 0, then, — -  < 0
^y t Sy,
The probability of collapse is the inverse function of real income. So, when the 
government adopts policies for raising real income, the chance of a collapsing exchange 
rate regime would be lowered. This implies that the supply of domestic credit creation is 
offset by the increase in the real money demand due to raised transactional demand, so 
that this mechanism will alleviate the pressure on the currency depreciation o f the 
exchange rate. However, an increased transaction caused by higher real income could 
aggravate the trade balance and thus current accounts (by accelerating the demand for the 
imported goods).'*^
(b) ^ < 0
dr^
In equation (2), the risk premium is added to the interest rate, expressed as 9 (Be -  
SBt*) / SP*ux. Therefore, to find the probability change related to the movement in risk 
premium, we need to analyze the influences of B  and B* on the Kt in equation (29). But, 
in equation (29), only Bt is a variable, and Bo andBj are assumed to be constant in the
previous section. By differentiating Kt with respect to Bt, we have dKt /  dBt < 0. This 
relationship implies that when the demand for the domestic bond increases, the risk
In fact, economically troubled Asian countries had experienced magnificent current accoimt and trade 
account deficits in the period leading to the crises (1995-1996). One of the main factors to aflfect these 
deficits could be the consumption boom partly due to the large increase in the rate of real income, caused 
by excessively optimistic expectations for the future economy.
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premium for the domestic currency would also increase. Thus, this relationship can be 
translated into the effect of risk premium on the change in Ki as follow, d TTt I d rt<Q.
As mentioned in Goldberg (1994), the negative relationship between Kt and rt stems 
from the fact that the demand for real balance will be lowered with an increase in the 
domestic interest rate.
(c) ^ > 0
oa^
The sufficient conditions for this inequality are a  > 0 and The probability of
collapse is positively related to the source of leakage from the demand for domestic real 
money, as theoretically expected.'*^ With devaluation expectations, the demand for 
domestic real balances will be lowered, thus this accelerates the foreign reserve stock out 
of the central bank. Kt, therefore, would rise and the collapse time will be also hastened 
with higher level o f a^, implying larger currency substitution.
The conditions for this negative relationship are that Pf+/* + apt~i > a/w , a i^a 3>Q, 
and /Ut+i>0.
In the literature, however, there have been conflicts with this \iew. Roger’s (1992a,b) empirical findings 
show that there is a negative and a statistically significant relationship between devaluation expectations 
and the ratio of the Mexodallar (dollar-denominated holdings in Mexican bank accoimts) to peso- 
denominated holdings. On the contrary, as argued in Ortiz (1983) and Ramirez-Rojas (1985), the rate of the 
MexodoUar to total Mexican bank deposits is positively correlated witli devaluation expectations. Gruben 
and Welch (1996) maintain the negative sign on devaluation expectations on the Mexodallar demand, based 
on the hypothesis o f the lender-of-last-resortand on the assumption of loan quality (variable).
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Several important factors during the period prior to recent Asian economic crises 
might have made the financial system in that region more unstable. These factors may 
include the production of a magnificent amount of non-performing loans, which is a 
critical component in triggering speculative attacks on the central bank’s foreign reserves. 
Therefore, as the ratio of the non-performing loan increases, the probability of a 
collapsing exchange rate regime would also rise. Thus, the inclusion of this factor in the 
model can better explain the current Asian economic crises. The accumulation of bad 
loans can be a serious current or future fiscal burden of a domestic government. Once 
agents recognize the worsening economic situation resulting from the interaction between 
the large stock of debt and the other crucial factors such as current and trade account 
deficits, or limited access to external credit, then they might get out o f investments in 
domestic assets and into the foreign credit market by triggering speculative attacks on the 
foreign reserves held by the domestic central bank. Thus, although this component (Nt) 
may be viewed as an opportunity for the currency substitution, this factor can be, rather, 
considered as a more direct and powerful factor to explain one of main reasons, (i.e., 
speculative attacks) which might have caused the recent Korean currency crises.
(e) — —  > 0 and — — —  > 0
For example, the fectors could be as foUows: borrowing too much from abroad and investing a lot in 
risky projects which turned out to be not profitable because of a moral hazard problem created by 
government’ promises of a bailout, resulting in low profitability; also financing speculative demand of 
existing assets in fixed supply such as land, real estate and the outstanding stock of equity, resulting in a 
large stock o f foreign debt due to the burst of the bubble caused by the above reasons.
61
The probability of collapse is positively correlated with the variability of domestic 
government deficits.'** % is also positively correlated with the variability of available 
external credit under the condition, 1/ Xi>0  and 1/ X2  > 0. The probability o f collapse is 
threatened by the limit to external credit inflows as long as two shocks to domestic credit 
creation are uncertain.
(Q —— —  > 0 and < 0
d ( l / w )  dp^
The effect of relaxing purchasing power parity is represented through two 
deviation components: systematic (pt) and random components — the random effect 
is done through 1/ w, a variance of random disturbance. The more random deviation 
from purchasing power parity exists, the less demand for domestic real balances. So, 
this leads to a higher probability of collapse of the exchange rate regime. The 
condition for this relationship is / /  w > 0. That is, as long as there exists a random price 
shock, the Kt is threatened to be collapsed.
As the long-run purchasing power disparity increases, the probability of collapse 
would decrease under the following sufficient condition, a  > 0. The logic behind this 
mechanism is as follows. An increase in Pt resulting from the more systematic deviation 
from the purchasing power parity raises the domestic price level (Or). This increase in Ot 
causes the nominal money demand to rise by the transaction motives, alleviating pressure 
on the domestic exchange rate. The effect of this component depends on the share of
The sufficient condition is {[24? + (A2X2 + w) 1/2/][l/ 2?]} / {^2 + (4z2? + :r) (i/2/) + w2? (7/2;)- }“ > 
[AT;(2;)- / (2?2; + w) (2; + 2?) ], where^2 = S aa- {aoiGBJPÎm + aajOBJPt'cf) and Kt={(,a+ai+a3)^Ja 
+  D, . i+Rc +  (^]/A.2)-[S a a - { f l i 6 B o l P ' m )  +  { a i d B J P ' [ P ' + a p t ^ i - { a l w ) \ } .
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non-traded goods and its degree o f elasticity in the domestic consumption. With less 
consumption in the imported goods, the impact of the systematic price deviation 
decreases. Also, if the demand for such non-traded goods is relatively inelastic, and as 
non-traded goods become systematically more expensive relative to traded goods, then 
the pressure on Tit will be lowered because of an increase in the money demand for 
maintaining a higher transaction cost. The non-traded goods prices have shown upward 
trends, stemming from the overvaluation of the domestic currency which is in part caused 
by a difference in the inflation rates between Korea (or the other troubled Asian 
countries) and OECD group. Since the prices of non-traded goods do not have the same 
competitive pressures as those of traded goods (i.e., there is inertia in the non-traded 
goods prices compared to the traded goods prices), the non-traded goods prices remain 
above the world level.
(s) 0ôa
The Tit is negatively correlated with the magnitude of domestic consumption in non- 
traded goods (û) under the sufficient conditions oî p  > 1/ w and a  > 0. During the 
periods leading to a currency crisis, there might have been big pressures on a devaluation 
and thus, also domestic currency might have been overvalued during that time. During 
the periods of more systematic deviation from the purchasing power parity (due to 
prolonged overvaluation of the domestic currency) relative to short-run variance of prices 
from the purchasing power parity, a  reduction in the share of the imported goods in 
domestic consumption would lower the pressure on the exchange rate.
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From equation (29), the sterilization can be operated only through a change in the 
domestic government bonds, B. As the monetary authority further sterilizes against the 
attacks on the central bank’s foreign reserves (this indicates a decrease in Bt in terms of 
markets), rCt will rise. The sufficient conditions for this relationship are; a  Av is not so 
large and a > 0. Under these conditions, the sterilization policy by the central bank’s 
purchase of the government bonds enables the domestic credit to be maintained at the 
same level as before the speculative attacks. Thus, with an additional factor that can 
further create domestic credit (rather than pure credit creation to finance a government 
budget deficit), the collapse of the fixed regime will be hastened. When the financing of 
government deficits were set up as a priority to fixing the exchange rate, they could be 
inevitably conflicting and the time of collapse of that fixed regime would be earlier than 
it would be if there were no primary targets in the exchange rate.
3.6 Conclusion
The theoretical model developed in this chapter extends the previous studies of 
speculative attack which are largely based on the view of standard crisis models. 
However, the model of this chapter is also designed to incorporate several characteristics 
of both first and second generation models of currency crises in attempting a better 
description of the 1997 Korean crisis.
For this purpose, the model introduces several important factors that would have 
influenced the economic circumstances before/during the crisis period: a sterilization 
policy, a ratio of non-performing loans, a time-varying risk premium, and internal and
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external credit shocks. In this context, this modified model provides some policy 
implications on the surrounding currency crisis by analyzing the change in the probability 
of the regime collapse in accordance with the movements o f  the variables and shocks: 
especially the sterilization operation increases the collapse probability by providing 
another source for creating domestic credit; and, the unstable external credit flows also 
increase the probability in the model.
Although this theoretical model is modified to better illustrate the Korean crisis, it 
may still have some limitations in describing all the features of the crisis because the 
model requires a number of strict assumptions. Regardless o f these limitations, however, 
with the expectation of this model to provide better intuition in understanding o f the 
recent currency crises, the empirical work will be performed by applying this extended 
model and then the Korean experience will be interpreted based on the empirical 
findings.
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CHAPTER 4
The Behavior of the Central Bank’s International Reserves and the
Level of the Reserve Floor
4.1 Survey on the Critical Reserve Floor
The assumption"*  ^of a critical lower bound on the level of the central bank’s foreign
reserves, which can trigger a speculative attack on the domestic currency, plays a crucial
role in the literature on the balance-of-payment crises as shown in the previous chapter.
The reason why the level of the reserve floor is a crucial factor in deriving the
collapse probability o f the fixed exchange rate regime is well analyzed in the study of
Cumby and van Wijnbergen (1989; pII8).
“The assumption that the authorities adhere to the crawling peg until some 
unknown reserve level, Rc, is reached is less restrictive than it may first 
appear. The decision rule about the change in the exchange rate regime made 
by the monetary authorities may depend on other factors and may be 
considerably more complex than the adoption o f some critical reserve level.
In the monetary model employed here, what matters to agents is the exchange 
rate (and therefore the money supply) that is expected if the crawling peg is 
abandoned. Since only the money supply matters to agents and since 
domestic credit creation is exogenous, agents care only about the stock of 
reserves that will remain once the peg is abandoned and not directly about any 
other factors that may enter the authorities’ decision rule. We therefore 
focus on the reserve level prevailing upon collapse rather than on other 
possible central bank decision rules.”
49 This assumption can be found in so-called standard speculative attack models. See, for example, 
Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984), Flood, et al. (1996), Blanco and Garber (1986), Cumby and 
van Wijnbergen (1989), Willman (1988,1989,1991), and Goldberg (1994).
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Blanco and Garber (1986) assumed that the reserve limit equals a constant Rc (the 
level of reserve floor) multiplied by an index o f U.S. import prices. They, however, used 
only Rc with, multiplying an index of U.S. import prices in order to derive the 
unconditional forecast of the exchange rate in their theoretical section.^® This alternation 
in their empirical examination accounts for the decreasing real value of the U.S. dollar 
and the increasing actual reserve level^  ^ due to the rapid growth of the Mexican economy 
throughout the sample period, 1973 :Q4 ~ 1981 :Q1. Since their minimum allowable net 
reserve level ( R c )  was calculated ex post the materialization of fixed regime collapse, 
their Rc specification would be invalid if Mexico’s access to external borrowing was 
increased such that Mexico succeeded in defending their exchange rate system.
Unlike commonly adopted critical reserve levels^^, Cumby and van Wijinbergen 
(1989) considered that the reserve floor may be either greater than zero or less than zero. 
This assumption is based on the fact that the monetary authority may give up maintaining 
the fixed exchange rate before the reserves are completely exhausted or may have access 
to the external credit so that net central bank’s holding of foreign assets could be 
negative. Cumby and van Wijinbergen, therefore, set the upper limit for Rc as being no 
higher than the current level in case of no collapse. For the lower R^ they assumed a 
negative value as in the Argentina casein February 1981 with the consideration of 
no additional foreign credits during a crisis but available only after policy reform such as 
a change in the exchange rate. In this case, the lower bound on Rc will be minus gross
In their theoretical part, the initial is reestimated by minimizing the sum of squared residuals o f the 
nonlinear future exchange rate equation until the parameter estimate for converges.
They assumed in the theoretical development thatiîc remains constant, regardless of the evolution of the 
other variables of the model.
For example, in Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984), the reserve floors are assumed to be zero 
at which the central bank will abandon the existing exchange rate peg.
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foreign liabilities. In their study, the distribution for the critical value has the form of 
uniform over the lower and upper bounds.
Willman (1989) analyzed the speculative behavior with an unknown threshold level 
of foreign reserves. He assumed an uncertainty about the threshold reserve level that is 
drawn from a normal distribution. With this probability distribution, he sets up three 
cases to analyze the speculative behavior of the reserves: (1) the case of a new threshold 
level and risk-neutral investors (i.e., a new level is obtained from the known probability 
distribution in each period); (2 ) the case of a fixed but unknown threshold level and risk- 
neutral investors (i.e., a value for the threshold level is drawn from the known 
distribution only oncey, and (3) a combination o f the first two cases (i.e., the investors do 
not know with certainty whether the threshold level is fixed or reconsidered at the end of 
each period). His results show that speculative behavior is quite sensitive to the 
specification of the process which produces the critical lower level of the foreign 
reserves.^^
Although Willman systematically formalized the critical level of the central bank’s 
foreign reserves in a situation in which domestic credit grows as steadily as standard 
balance-of-payments models, the limit of his method could be that he performed only 
simulation experiments by choosing certain numbers in order to estimate the parameters 
in the distribution function. That is, his method has no validation of the empirical work 
using real data. '^*
^ In the first case (i.e., the stochastic threshold levels), a speculative outflow of reserves occurs over 
several periods of time. In the second case with a fixed but imknown threshold level, there were repeated 
single period attacks on the currency with zero probability o f devaluation between attacks. The results of 
the third case show the speculative attacks with non-zero probability of devaluation between attacks.
^ However, it seems to be hard to derive a distribution fimction using real data because of the 
nonlinearities in the model.
6 8
Goldberg (1994) adopted a more ad hoc reserve floor level, ranging -2 0 0  million to 
1 billion 1977 U.S. dollar. According to her, performing the empirical examination with 
this range may test more conservatively the out-of-sample predictive estimation of the 
model than the other studies did, in which they rely on the use of information available 
only ex post.^^
As in Cumby and van Wijinbergen (1989), the minus reserve floor in the Goldberg 
(1994) study indicates the fact that the domestic monetary authority may have been in a 
good position to the available foreign credit in order to defend the exchange rate. 
Goldberg’s (1994) empirical estimation shows that the pattern of the results are 
qualitatively robust regarding the choice of the critical reserve floor, but the estimated 
shadow exchange rates depend quantitatively on the values of the reserve floor. 
Consequently, this result implies that the estimated probabilities (that the estimated 
shadow exchange rates would exceed the previously announced exchange rates) cannot 
be also robust quantitatively.
While the above approaches to find the level of minimum reserves have their own 
advantages, we will, instead, adopt an equation of demand for reserves (rather than a 
nominal level of reserve itself) which incorporates the behavior of foreign reserves with 
the several macroeconomic variables that influence the determination of foreign reserves 
around the problematic period.
The structure of the estimated residuals from the reserve demand equation will give 
some useful information on the form and persistence of deviation from the desired long- 
run level of reserves if the estimated demand function truly characterizes the real desired
In. the literature on the standard balance-of-payments crisis models, is assumed to be not available ex 
ante to the public until the exchange rate system actually collapses.
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levels of foreign reserves. The regression result will also provide the speed of adjustment 
to shocks, implemented by the monetary authority.
4.2 Demand for Desired Reserves and Crisis
It could be said that a central bank holds international reserves^^ for two purposes: 
(1) for the international transactions such as the importation of goods and services; (2 ) for 
a buffer stock to stabilize the exchange rate between the domestic and foreign currencies 
through the financing o f  temporary imbalances in a country’s external payments.^^
As most economic theories in which the demand for any commodity is determined 
by a utility maximization procedure, the demand for reserves can be considered as an 
outcome of weighing the marginal benefits of holding reserves against the marginal cost 
of holding the additional unit of reserves. However, the theory o f the demand for 
reserves may seem to be more complex because the benefits and costs of holdings of 
reserves are involved in the highly fluctuating variables of the economic system. In 
addition, the issue can be more complex due to the stochastic features stemming from the 
uncertainty of implemented policies. Thus, “under these circumstances any demand 
function for reserves can be considered a reduced form of a large macro-economic 
model” (Farzinvash, 1989; p 98).
The model used in the next section for estimating the demand for reserves is the 
partial adjustment model based on the optimization approach to the demand for
The international reserves usually consist of gold, convertible foreign exchange, reserve position in the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).
^ Based on the monetary approach to demand for international reserves, there could be another motive of 
holding reserves, which is a speculative motive. Although investment of national wealth into foreign asset 
reduces capital loss or performs a portfolio diversification, there are no strong evidences or reasons for 
central banks to hold reserves for the speculative motives.
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reserves/* In this approach, the demand for desired reserve is dependent on the 
government’s welfare-maximizing under uncertain behavior. Clark (1970a), using a 
four-quadrant diagram, analyzed the relationship between the speed of adjustment (i.e., 
the speed of adjusting the gap between actual and desired levels of reserves) and the level 
of national income. The combination of a higher level o f reserves and a lower speed of 
adjustment relates to a lower but more stable level o f national income. On the contrary, a 
lower level of reserves with a higher speed o f adjustment involves an increase in the 
volatility of the national income. To optimize the demand for reserves, the one point is 
selected, on which the trade-off between the level o f income and the variability o f income 
is most desirable.^® By holding a higher level o f reserves, national income may be 
sacrificed due to the opportunity cost of losing more productive investments. 
Stabilization from the external shocks, however, can be regarded as an advantage in the 
case of higher holdings of reserves. Holding a lower level of reserves enables a country 
to achieve a higher level of national income on average, but it may provide more unstable 
levels of income due to the difficulty in adjusting the income against the external shocks.
In the optimization approach, the average reserve holdings by the central bank are 
positively related to the income and the variability o f the balance of payments, and 
inversely related to the opportunity cost of reserve holdings and the marginal propensity 
to imports.^”
Heller (1966), followed by Clark (I970ab), Kelly (1970), and Britto and Heller (1973), initiated this 
approach.
 ^ In that point, the government utility function is tangent to the highest indifference curve. See Clark 
(1970a) for more detail.
^  In the literature on the demand for reserves, two possibilities concerned with the sign of marginal 
propensity to import (MPI) can be proposed. First, when the MPI is used as a measure o f the output 
adjustment to external trade disturbances, the MPI is inversely related to the demand for reserves. This 
relationship stems from the Keynesian fixed price model of foreign trade multiplier where the trade 
multiplier has negative movement with MPI. Second, if  the MPI is considered as a proxy of the degree of
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Until now, the precautionary motives for holding reserves have been focused on the 
demand for reserves. However, the transaction motive may not be overlooked since the 
models^^ used to estimate the reserve demand function include the fector as an 
independent variable, reflecting the transaction motives (for example, the scale of an 
economy). The study on the transaction motive demand for reserves is usually related to 
the level of imports and to the level of reserve-imports. Based on the application of the 
quantity theory of money to international trade, the demand for reserves is expected to 
increase with the higher level of trade. This theory, however, has been criticized on the 
ground that since reserves are needed only for adjusting the gap between payments and 
receipts they should be connected with the variability of international payments rather 
than to the level of import itself. This argument stems from the different view on the 
purpose of reserve holdings, focusing more on trading. Despite this criticism, many 
researchers have used total imports or total incomes as a measurement of a country’s size 
(i.e., as a measurement of transactional demand for international reserves).
Furthermore, the transaction motive can be granted as an important factor to hold 
foreign reserves especially in many non-oil-producing countries where lots of portions of 
their incomes are allotted to the imports of crude petroleum or raw materials. The degree 
of opermess measured by MPI can be regarded as a transaction as well as a precautionary 
demand for reserves. That is, the higher degree o f openness indicates that a country is 
more willing to trade with other countries, and thus will need more transaction stock of
openness rather than a proxy for the cost of output adjustment, the demand for reserves is positively related 
to the MPI. This relationship reflects that the higher tlie degree of opermess to the external economies, the 
more vulnerable they are to the external shocks, so that the country will need a larger level o f  reserves.
For instance, see Edwards (1983,1984,1985) and Frenkel (1978, 1980).
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reserves. Also, this means that a country with higher degree of openness is vulnerable to 
the external disturbances, and it will need a higher buffer stock of reserves.^^
From the evidence of recent currency crises,®  ^ the importance of foreign reserves as 
a source of liquidity is growing under the current high movement of international capital. 
This fact implies that a country should increase the buffer stock of reserves regardless of 
its exchange rate system and regardless of the exchange rate systems of its major trading 
partners, faced by highly volatile international capital and weakness in the financial 
sector. '^* Especially in Asian countries, the growth rates of reserves have been less than 
that of GDP. Thus, to prevent future crises, each country should maintain a proper level 
o f net reserves,otherw ise future disasters may be at hand due to the abrupt capital 
outflows which limit access to the foreign credit (liquidity problem).
Following the above explanations of demand for reserves, in the next section, the 
demand for international reserves will be estimated based on a model which has two 
concepts: first, the transaction demand for reserves to finance international trades; 
second, the precautionary motive for reserve demand against the external disturbances.
In the next section, the degree of openness is considered as a transaction motive rather than a buffer 
stock, even if the sign of this variable is expected to be positive regardless of the motives.
® These crises include the 1992-93 ERM crises, the 1994 Mexican peso crisis, and the 1997 Asian currency 
crises.
^ In theory, a country is expected to hold a lower level o f reserves under a flexible exchange rate regime 
than in the pegged system because o f less need of reserves to maintain exchange rate under fixed regime. 
Also, in theory, a country with a fixed exchange rate system is exposed to greater variability of import 
payments and export receipts when trading with a country that adopts a more flexible exchange rate regime. 
^  In fact, the level of net reserves has much more important meaning than that of nominal reserves because 
one of the main factors to generate the recent currency crises can be attributed to the sudden capital 
outflows.
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4.3 Estimation of the Desired Demand for Reserves
Theoretically when a country is faced with a run-out of reserves, that country 
devalues its currency as one method of adjusting for the balance of payments. Edwards 
argues that “the level of international reserves that trigger a devaluation should be 
measured in relation to the desired level of reserves, and not with respect to some 
absolute arbitrary level” (1983; pl3). Connecting this idea to the critical level of floor 
reserves that triggers a collapse of fixed exchange rate regime, we can make use of a 
partial adjustment model based on the optimizing approach. This method has an 
advantage in finding Rc in that estimating reserve demand function incorporates the major 
macroeconomic variables with the level of reserve itself, and thus the estimation results 
can show the behavior of reserves. This, in turn, indicates that actual reserves have fallen 
under the desired level prior to a crisis. In addition, the estimated residuals will give 
information as follows: the residuals are expected to be negative prior to a crisis, meaning 
that reserves have indeed fallen under their desired levels when they approach a crisis 
period.
4.3,1 Model
Most studies on the dynamic behavior of international reserves have focused on the 
partial adjustment model that postulates that a country adjusts its current stock o f reserves 
in portion to the discrepancy between actual and desired reserves. The partial adjustment 
model can be written as follows:
(4.1)
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where R t—R[.i is a change in reserves between period t and t-1 , R* refers to the stocks of
desired reserves at period t, and ;r denotes the speed of adjustment which lies between
zero and unity. On the other hand, R* —Ri_i is the discrepancy between desired and
actual reserves at the beginning of the period. Since the desired level of reserves is not 
directly observable, we need to assume that the long-run desired level of reserves is 
determined by several explanatory variables. Following Bilson and Frenkel (1979), the 
desired reserve function takes the following form;
R* = cco + ai Y: + % AFIt + or? o? + iit (4.2)
where Yt is the value of national income; API is the average propensity to import which is 
used for a proxy for the marginal propensity to import (MP/); a? denotes the variability 
measure; and Ut is an error term.®^
In the above equation, the validation of the transaction demand for reserves is 
measured by the size and the statistical significance of the coefficients of Yt and APR (i.e., 
ai and or?, respectively). On the other hand, the importance of the buffer stock of holding 
reserves stems from the statistical significance of the coefficients of 03, <%. It is assumed 
that the desired demand for reserves is expected to have positive relations with a scale 
variable (Y or GDP), a variable measuring the degree of openness of the economy (API), 
and a variable measuring the variability of international payments (03), respectively. 
Substituting equation (4.2) into equation (4.1), we obtain:
^  Some authors do not include the stochastic error term in equation (4.2). Some authors, however, add the 
error term to the equation, believing that if the former (i.e., the equation (4.2) without irO is truly an 
equilibrium relation, there is no scope for the error term, whereas the adjustment mechanism can be 
imperfect and may require the stochastic disturbance term in equation (4.2).
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R[ — po Pi Yt + P2  AFIt + /% Of + P4Rt-i -r St (4.3)
where Po = ttcco. Pi = tvui, P2  = nu2, ps = ;r<%, P4  = (1- (X4 , and St = mit.
Hence,
=  g i  =  _   ^ ,  g ;  =  ' .  '  , « 3 =
(1-ygJ
Whereas equation (4.2) represents the long-run or equilibrium demand for reserves, 
equation (4.3) denotes the short-run demand for reserves because in the short run the 
existing reserve stock may not necessarily be equal to its long-run level. Once we 
estimate the short-run demand function, equation (4.3), we can derive the long-run 
demand function by simply using the above formulas and omitting the lagged reserve 
(i?f./), which will, then, give equation (4.2).
4.3.2 Data
The empirical analysis is carried out using monthly seasonally adjusted data 
between February 1990 and April 1998 using International Financial Statistics (IFS) on 
CD-ROM.®^ The data series for each variable are listed in table 4.1.
The variability of external payments (i.e., variable 0 ?) has often been approximated 
by using a trend-adjusted measure of changes in the stock of reserves. For example, in
^  Instead of using dummy variables, an exponential smoothing technique is employed to eliminate the 
seasonal variations in the reserve holdings.
76
Frenkel (1978) and Edwards (1983,1984,1985), to calculate cr^, the following regression 
is first run;
R[ = a  + Prt + ÎI over t =  T - n , T  
where Rt is the level o f  reserves for year t and n is number of years over which the 
regression is run. Then using the estimated trend, , cr^ is defined as the variance of 
the trend-adjusted changes in the stock of international reserves as following:
f=r—rt
The variability measure is defined as <j^. Other studies have used the standard deviation 
of export receipts or the balance of payments as the measure of variability.^*
Table 4.1: Data for Reserve Demand Estimation
Exchange Rate: Won per U.S. dollar, end of period rate. Line ae, IFS.
Reserves: Total Reserves minus Gold, end of period, in millions of US dollars. 
Line ll.d, IFS.
Imports: In millions of U.S. dollar. Line 71, IFS.
Income: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in billions of won. Line 99b, IFS.
Note: GDP is converted to the U.S. dollar value using the above exchange rate.
Unlike previous s t u d i e s , t h e  pure time series data are adopted to run regression 
for the reserve demand function in the next section. Many economic time series data do 
not have a constant mean and variance and they exhibit phases of relative tranquility
See, for instance, Kenen and Yudin (1965) and Kelly (1970).
Most previous studies have used cross-sectional data or pooled cross-sectional and time series data in 
regression of reserve demand function.
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followed by periods of high volatility. Observing figure 4.1, these phenomena seem to be 
supportable. That is, there might exist evidence that the movement in the time-series of
Figure 4.1; Foreign Reserves (millions of U.S. dollar)
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reserves is not stable, showing an upward trend which is interrupted by a decline, 
followed by a resumption of the positive growth and then sharply falling again. In fact, 
international reserve holdings by the bank of Korea during the sample period have been 
confirmed to be nonstationary time-series data, after performing several formal tests for 
nonstationarity.™
Under this background information, we model any tendency of variance in the 
reserve series by using an autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) or a
These include the tests using correlogram based on the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation 
functions, Ljung-Box (LB) statistics, and Dickey-Fuller (OF) unit-root test The result of the D-F test will 
be reported in a later section of this chapter.
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generalized ARCH (GARCH) process in order to derive a variability variable which will 
be used as a proxy o f  that variable in the reserve demand function.
To describe the dynamic behavior of the reserve time series (i.e., to find a fitted 
ARMA process), the series must be stationary. Although the time-series data of reserves 
are not stationary, the first differenced values o f the series are the stationary process with 
which the fitted model of reserve series can be found. Based on the Box-Jenkins 
methodology, the fitted model which describes the evolution of international reserves 
during the sample period is an autoregressive model, as shown in the following:
(4.5)
The next step is to find an appropriate ARCH (or GARCH) error process related to the 
above AR model. That is, estimating simultaneously the above model (equation (4.5)) 
and the various specifications of the error process, the following ARCH process is 
modeled as a proper description for the evolution of the variance in the time-series data 
of the first-differenced value of reserves.
= ^ 0 +"i^r'-4 (4-6)
where ht is the conditional variance of St.
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Finally, the series o f variability which will be used as a proxy o f the variability 
variable in the reserve demand equation is calculated by using the estimated coefficients 
o f equation (4.5)7^
AÆ =160.485 + 0.I08A/?, , +0.302AÆ , -0.22AÆ , -hs,I  1 -1  t - -  t - 5  t  y \
(0.188) (0.144) (0.000) (0.027)
A, =10057.68 +  0.748^,7, (4.8)
(0.000) (0.029)
where the values in the parentheses indicates the significant levels (i.e., p-values).
4.3.3 Issues in Estimation
In order to estimate the reserve demand function, the method of ordinary least 
square (OLS) is performed. An OLS estimator is said to be the best linear unbiased 
estimator (BLUE), given the assumptions of the classical linear regression model (i.e., 
this is called Guass-Markov Theorem). However, when one or more of the assumptions 
does not hold, OLS does not provide BLUE estimators, though it still may give better 
estimates in some cases. In practice, tw^ o major types of problems arise in applying the 
classical linear regression model: (1) those due to assumptions about the specification of 
the model and about the disturbances; (2) those due to assumptions about the data. With 
respect to problems arising from the assumptions about the first category, two important 
issues are most often discussed; autocorrelation and hetroscedasticity. For the second
This analysis has been performed using the RATS (4.20). The coefBcients of equation (4.6), oq and a\, 
have been obtained by guessing the initial values and then adopting an iterative technique using the 
maximum likelihood estimation.
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type of problem, multicollinearity is most often referred to as one factor to destroy the 
BLUE property o f OLS estimators.
If the regression residuals are serially correlated, the OLS estimators are no longer 
efScient, although they remain unbiased as well as consistent. In short, they are no 
longer BLUE. To detect the presence of autocorrelation in the estimation, the Durbin- 
Watson d  statistic is most widely used. However, when an estimated model has one or 
more lagged dependent variables as regressors, the use of the Durbin h statistic is 
suggested to detect the autocorrelation.^^ When autocorrelation is detected in the original 
estimation, that problem can be remedied by the method of generalized difference 
equation (i.e., generalized least square or GLS). This method involves transforming the 
original data into the data set in which the error terms are independent.
The second problem in estimating OLS may come when the disturbances of the 
regression are not constant, called heteroscedastisity. Heteroscedastisity does not destroy 
the unbiasness and consistent properties of OLS estimators. But, these estimators are no 
longer minimum variance or efBcient. That is, they are not BLUE. The presence of 
heteroscedastisity can be found by several formal methods. As noted above, the 
estimators in the presence of hetroscedastisity are no longer efficient and this lack of 
efficiency makes the usual hypothesis-testing procedure of dubious value. Therefore, 
remedial measures are clearly called for. Based on OLS residuals, one can guess at the 
likely pattern of heteroscedastisity and then transform the original data in such a way that
'■ Durbin h statistic is A = ( I -  —(Q j ^  , where n is the number of sample size, and var{d) is the
2 y l-n [var(a)J
estimated variance of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. When the value of n[var(a)] 
exceeds unity, the Dtubin h statistic carmot be used. In this case, the other technique such as the Breusch- 
Godfrey (EG) test may be used for testing autocorrelation.
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in the transformed data there is no heteroscedastisity, which is called a method of 
weighted least square regression (or WLS).^
Another problem in estimating the classical linear regression model may stem from 
the existence of multicollinearity that refers to a situation where there is either an exact or 
approximately exact linear relationship among the independent variables. A moderate 
multicollinearity would cause no bias in the estimated coefficients, and it has little effect 
on the overall significance of the regression or on the estimates of any no- 
multicollinearity variables. In the presence of severe multicollinearity, however, 
coefficients will have a wrong sign or an implausible magnitude in spite of the facts that 
they are jointly highly significant and the in the regression is quite high.
One of the formal tests for the multicollinearity is the method of ‘Eigenvalues and 
Condition Index” In general, the problem of multicollinearity can be reduced by (1) 
combining cross-sectional and time series data; (2) omitting a highly collinear variable; 
(3) transforming data; and (4) obtaining additional or new data. In short, if 
multicollinearity does not make the ^-values change so much (i.e., multicollinearity 
makes the ^-values unchanging in the significance), then regression using original data 
without solving multicollinearity problem may be the best way for the regression. 
That is, a remedy for multicollinearity needs to be considered when the presence of
Wliite’s (1980) heteroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation can be applied to correct the 
estimates for an unknown form o f heteroscedasicity. This procedure is useful if we are unsure of the 
precise nature or pattern of the heteroscedasticiiy. The formula for the covariance matrix is
var(p) = nÇX'X)  ^5g(^'X )  ^, where 5'q = — . See White (1980), for more detail.
The condition number of a matrix is the square root of the ratio of tire largest to the smallest 
characteristic root. Condition Index (Cl), where Cl =-^[Maxinmmeigenvalue / Minimumeigenvalue .
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multicollinearity makes the /-values change and makes the estimated coefBcients 
(in)significant or unreliable.
Finally, the problem of the spurious regression can arise when one nonstationary 
time series is regressed on another nonstationary time series and if the two series are not 
cointegrated of the same order. In this case, the standard t and F  testing procedures are 
not valid. However, in spite of being individually nonstationary, a linear combination of 
two or more time series can be stationary when the variables are cointegrated, in which 
case the traditional significant tests on the regression results can be applied because the 
regression is meaningful (i.e., not spurious). Engle-Granger, CRDW (Cointegrating 
Regression Durbin-Watson), and Johansen tests can be used to find out whether two or 
more time series are cointegrated.
4.3.4 Analysis of the Empirical Results
4.3.4.1 The Patterns of International Reserves along with Current and 
Capital Accounts
Due to the failure o f managing the exchange rate as a means of adjusting the current 
account, Korea adopted a multi-currency basket peg system in February 1980. This 
system had advantages of maintaining the price competitiveness of goods and of 
stabilizing the exchange rate by pegging it to the SDR.
The Korean currency, the won, was sharply depreciated against the U.S. dollar 
between 1980 and 1986 by almost 40 percent.^^ However, the won was actually 
appreciated by 7 percent against the Japanese yen because the U.S. dollar appreciated
75 During this period, however, the U.S. dollar also appreciated sharply against other major currencies.
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over 30 percent against the yen between 1980 and 1984. The relationship between the 
rates of the won/dollar and the won/yen (or yen/dollar) implies that Korea was not put in 
a competitive position in exports over Japan during the mid 1980s, despite the sharp 
depreciation of the won against U.S. dollar.
In 1986, the won began to appreciate against the US. dol lar ,whereas the 
yen/dollar rate and the Taiwan dollar/U.S. dollar rate declined 21 percent and 11 percent, 
respectively, in 1986. These trends lasted a few more years. Consequently, in spite of 
the appreciation of the won against the U.S. dollar, Korea was still able to keep a 
competitive position over its competitors such as Japan and Taiwan.’  ^ These movements 
of the currencies continued until 1987, and thus Korea was able to achieve high growth 
rates of exports to the U.S., despite the appreciation of the won. However, in the 
following year, the won was further appreciated by 13 percent under the pressure o f  the 
U.S. government which experienced the growing trade deficit during those 7 years. As a 
result, the growth rate of export began to decline inl988 and further inl989, which was 
enforced by the depreciation of the yen.
In the line of these currency movements, Korean economy faced a favorable 
environment within the world economy, which has been called the “three lows” or the 
“three blessings”; low oil prices, low world interest rate, and low yen/dollar rate. The 
decrease in the oil price^* in the late 1980s reduced the cost of energy imports. Since 
Korea does not produce even one drop of crude oil, payment for the imported crude oil
This appreciation against U.S. dollar was the first time in the history of the Korean exchange rate, and it 
lasted three more years until 1989.
Since Korea has been highly dependent on imports from Japan, the growth rate of exports to tlie U.S. has 
been offset by the growth rate o f imports from Japan. Therefore, under this specific trade relation with 
U.S. and Japan, the cross exchange rates among the three coimtries largely affect Korea’s trade balance.
The oil price dropped from $34.1 per barrel in 1981 to $13.9 per barrel in 1988.
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has been a great burden on the country’s economic growth. Thus, the fall in oil price led 
to a sharp decrease in the economic cost, lowering the price level. Under low oil prices, 
the price competitiveness of export products could be improved, leading to an increase in 
the national income. However, this affirmative effect was partially offset by the increase 
in the volume of imports with higher levels of income. According to Cho (1995), the 
current account surplus was affected mainly by the falling oil prices rather than the other 
two lows.
The second blessing, the low world interest rate, lowered the cost of external debt 
of the Korean government and banks. With low world interest rates, the government was 
able to achieve the budget balance, leading to an increase in the public consumption and 
investment expenditures. On the other hand, the Korean banks had easier access to the 
world credit market for investment purposes.
The last blessing, the strong yen, gave Korea an export stimulus and an increase in 
import price of capital goods from Japan. This mixed effect, nevertheless, resulted in the 
current account surpluses in the mid 1980s as noted earlier.
Along with the current account surpluses between 1986 and 1989, the domestic 
financial market has been progressively liberalized since 1984 when foreign direct 
investment (FDI) was partially freed. In 1984, direct portfolio investment (DPI) by 
foreigners was partially allowed, and investment in Korean stocks through investment 
funds was also allowed. The capital inflows into Korea, however, had moderately 
increased until the beginning of the 1990s when the Korean financial market was
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Table 4.2 Current and Capital Accounts, Foreign Reserves, and Exchange Rate
Year Current Account^^ Capital Account^^ Foreign Reserves^^ Exchange Rate^^
1980 -5.3 3.8 6.6 659.9
1981 -4.6 2.8 6.9 700.5
1982 -2.6 1.2 6.9 748.8
1983 -1.6 2.2 6.9 795.5
1984 -1.3 1.3 7.6 827.4
1985 -0.9 0.5 7.7 890.2
1986 4.6 -2.4 7.9 861.4
1987 9.8 -5.8 9.2 792.3
1988 14.1 -2.4 12.4 684.1
1989 5.0 -3.4 15.2 679.6
1990 -2.1 3.9 14.8 716.4
1991 -8.7 4.2 13.7 760.8
1992 -4.5 8.3 17.1 788.4
1993 0.3 6.9 20.3 808.1
1994 -4.5 9.2 25.7 788.7
1995 -8.8 13.5 32.7 774.7
1996 -23.7 17.2 34.0 844.2
1997 -8.2 -9.1 20.4 1695.0
Note: 1) Billion dollars.
2) Total Reserve minus Gold, billion dollars.
3) End of Period, won to U.S. dollars.
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
further liberalized. Therefore, during the period 1987-1989, the sharp increase in the 
stock of international reserves mainly stemmed from the current account surpluses rather 
than the capital inflows. At this time, the Korean monetary authority had implemented 
sterilization policy and repaid external debt in order to decrease the effect of the sharp 
increased liquidity on the domestic economy. The decline of international reserves 
during 1990-91 stemmed from this repayment of foreign debt caused by the four year 
consecutive surpluses in trade balance.
During the multi-currency basket system, there was a doubt that the exchange rate 
had not been considered properly in reflecting the supply and the demand for foreign 
exchange in the Korean exchange market. Furthermore, Korean monetary authority gave
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an unfavorable impression to its major trading partners, especially to the United States, 
which had a suspicion of exchange rate manipulation by the Korean government so as to 
keep the favorable price competitive position against major trading partners. This 
suspicion may have stemmed from the fact that because o f the consecutive current 
account surpluses, the won was not thought to be appreciated sufficiently against the U.S. 
dollar even though the surpluses were mainly thanks to the “three lows” at this period. 
Thus, Korea adopted the market-average exchange rate system in February 1990, which 
is one of the managed floating exchange rate systems. In this system, the exchange rate 
is determined by the supply and the demand for foreign exchanges in the domestic 
market. The advantages of this system are as follows: first, this system properly supports 
foreign transactions by promoting the price function of the exchange rate system; and 
second, the trade friction caused by the exchange rate policy is alleviated. This system 
differs from the “pegged to the multi-currency basket” in that exchange rate is 
determined by supply and demand for foreign exchange to some extent. This system is 
also different from the “pure floating rate” in that the monetary authorities can intervene 
in the foreign exchange market. The market-average exchange rate system was thought 
to be an outpost for transferring into the free floating exchange rate system.
At the beginning of the new exchange rate regime, the won began to depreciate 
against the U.S. dollar, which might have had negative effects on the trade balance until 
1993 when the trade balance of Korea returned to a surplus again when a favorable 
movement in exchange rate returned (i.e., the advent of the strong yen).
The persistent recession in most industrial countries in the early 1990s also 
alleviated Korea’s export stimulus even with the continuing depreciation of the won. In
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addition, the diminishing effect o f the first two lows (i.e., low world interest rate and low 
oil price) among the “three lows” gave an unfavorable economic circumstance to the 
Korean export-oriented growth policy.
Even with trade deficits, foreign reserves continued to increase during the early 
1990s due to the capital inflows.^^ During the period of 1994 and 1995, Korea achieved 
high economic growth as compared to the previous two years. This was due to the 
rapidly expanding exports thanks to the strong yen and increasing foreign demand. 
However, current account deficit marked $8.8 billion in 1995 because of a higher pace of 
imports than that of exports. On the other hand, as shown in figure 4.2, capital inflows 
soared continuously and were channeled to the international reserves, which have 
increased by about 120 percent in the last five years. In 1995, the capital account surplus 
increased to $13.5 billion from the previous year’s surplus of $9.0 billion. These sharp 
capital inflows can be explained by external and internal factors. Key external factors are 
low interest rates that have prevailed in the U.S. and Japan during early 1990s. These 
low interest rates along with the persistent recessions in most developed countries have 
turned the attentions of investors to the high-investment yields and improving economic 
prospects o f developing countries in Asia. An internal factor to attract capital inflows is 
the liberalization of the domestic financial market.
For example, there was a capital inflow o f almost $800 million during the first quarter of 1992 alone 
when the direct purchase of Korean stocks by foreigners was further allowed. In 1993, Korea had $9.6 
billion in inflows and $0.7 in outflows for a balance of $8.9 billion long-term capital. Its short-term capital 
balance was $ 2.0 billion.
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Figure 4.2: Capital Account fKA) and Change in Foreign Reserves (CRES); (billions of U.S. dollar)
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The capital account surpluses sharply increased from $5.2 billion during the period 
of 1990-1993 to $17.4 billion during 1994-96. The main reason for the surpluses and 
large growth of the capital account was due to the fast increasing rate of the capital 
inflows under the liberalization of the domestic financial market. There was, however, 
more of a need of foreign credit to pay the foreign debt led by the increased current 
account deficits which have happened again since 1990.
In 1996, the Korean economic growth rate dropped to 7.1 percent from 8.9 percent 
in 1995. This fall in the economic growth was mainly due to sluggish exports and 
investments. The trade deficit and the current account deficit in 1996 marked a record 
high $15.3 and $23.7 billion, respectively, thanks to several factors. First, the sudden 
drop in unit export price and the sluggish growth in export volume were heavy blows to
89
Korea’s export industries.*® Second, the attainment o f $10,000 per annual capita income 
brought with it an expending consumption trend. This, along with increased 
liberalization of imports, resulted in large-scale expansion and invited increased imports 
o f luxury consumer goods. Although the growth in imports also decreased in 1996, the 
trade deficit showed a record high because of a drastic fall in exports. Third, the deficit 
in the trade balance was sharply expanded up to $15.3 billion.
On the other hand, the capital account balance increased by almost 25 percent in 
1996 (fi'om $13.4 billion to $17.2 billion). This increase was caused by a further opening 
of the Korean financial market,*^ an expectation of appreciation of the won/dollar rate by 
importers who tried to take advantage of large interest rate differential between domestic 
and foreign rates by taking out short-term foreign loans to finance their imports, and the 
investment by domestic firms with low world interest rates.
The won against the U.S. dollar depreciated by almost 9 percent during 1996 as 
compared to the previous year (1995). This weak won could be attributed to the 
deterioration in the balance o f payment. That is, the enormous current account deficit 
was not offset by the capital account surplus because capital inflow during the second 
half o f 1996 significantly decreased. The decrease was due to the unfavorable economic 
circumstance of the foreign investors such as the narrower gap in interest rates between 
the domestic and world financial markets, and it was also due to a decrease in the
For instance, the prices of semiconductors (16MB DRAM chips), which consisted of 25 percent of 
Korea’s total export combined with petrochemical products, sharply dropped from $45 in January to $8 in 
December due to the world-wide exceed of supply.
The upper limit on aggregate stock holdings by foreigners was raised by 3 percent (from 15% to 18%) in 
April, which, in addition to the previous $3 billion, resulted in a capital inflow of $1.7 billion in April.
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trade credits by Korean exports because of sharp depreciation of the won against the U.S. 
dollar.
Even though the capital inflow has risen by 25 percent more in 1996 than the 
previous year, the foreign reserve holdings by the bank of Korea decreased for the first 
time since 1990 due to the record high current account deficit. The holdings of 
international reserves by bank of Korea dropped by more than 10 percent from June to 
November in 1996.
During the first half of 1997, the Korean economy showed a GDP growth rate of 
5.9 percent, which was a rate of less than 7.3 percent in the same period of the previous 
year. This was mainly caused by the slow down in domestic investment and 
consumption. However, as the growth rate of imports was reversed by that of exports, 
the current account deficit marked $11.1 billion during the first seven months, which was 
less than that of the same period in the previous year ($12.2 billion). The movement of 
the won/dollar rate showed a stable path at around 890 won since the second quarter, 
mainly due to the factors such as a decreasing current account deficit and increasing 
capital inflows. But, the won began to depreciate against the U.S. dollar because of the 
pessimistic future of the Korean economy by foreigners who had already observed the 
bankruptcies of large conglomerates {chabol) such as Hanbo, Sammi, Jinro, Dainong, and 
Kia motors (8^ largest conglomerate in Korea) and uprising concerns about contagion 
effect from the Southeast Asian crises. Consequently, the capital outflow rapidly 
increased by withdrawing foreign portfolio investments from the Korean stock market. 
In addition, with shrinking access to international credits in response to the sharp down­
grading of Korea’s long-term sovereign rating and of most commercial banks’ credit
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ratings by the foreign credit rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, the 
won was rapidly depreciated from the middle of October on through to the end of the 
year.
The value of the won precipitated in the end of November to 1,163 won per U.S. 
dollar, which value was a loss of 27.5 percent more than at the end of 1996. With the 
persistent current account deficit and the fall in reserve holdings by domestic money 
banks caused by the exhaustion of capital inflows, lots of companies and financial 
institutions had to rely entirely on the stock of foreign reserves held by the bank of Korea 
in order to avoid defaults on their foreign currency obligations. As the international 
reserve holdings of the bank of Korea sharply dropped in November, the bank of Korea 
stopped intervention in the foreign exchange market, and the Korean government 
requested the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for an emergency bail-out package on 
November 21 in order to avoid the national i n s o l v e n c y O n  December 3, 1997, Korea 
signed an agreement for IMF’s financial aid package which amounted to $58.3 billion.
The won/dollar rate began to drop to around 1,500 won due to the substantial 
current account surplus, the resumption o f capital inflows from foreign investments in the 
Korean stock market, and the success of the New York talks on rearranging the maturity 
of Korean financial sector debt.*  ^ Especially with the success of the New York talks for 
the roll-over of debt, the foreign reserves have begun to stabilize and to grow again. The
^  The foreign reserves had run dangerously low, with its official reserve standing at $23.9 billion on 
December 2, down from $30.5 billion at the end of October. Of the $23.9 billion, $6 billion was “imusable 
funds”.
“  On January 28,1998, the Korean government and global creditors agreed to exchange about $24 billion 
of the Asian nation short-term debt for govenunent-guaranteed loans. Under the deal, negotiated by 13 
leading international banks, Korean banks can exchange their short-term non-trade credits for new loans 
with maturities of one, two, and three years. These loans will be guaranteed by the Korean government 
and will bear a floating interest rate of 2.25%, 2.5%, and 2.75% over the six-month London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR).
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woa against the U.S. dollar has moved between 1,500 and 1,600, and had been 
fluctuating around 1,700 after abolishing the daily floating limit on December 16, 1997 
until end of January 1998.
4.3A.2 Empirical Results on the Reserve Demand
Using the Dickey-Fuller(T)-F) method, a unit-root test for stationarity is performed 
in this paper, and the results are presented in table 4.3. After showing that all time series 
are random walk processes and nonstationary, a cointegration test is proceeded using 
Engle-Granger (EG) procedure.
As shown in table 4.3, for the level variables, the Dickey-Fuller (D-F) test shows 
that all variables in the reserves demand function are unit-root processes and thus 
nonstationary time series since estimated /-values are smaller than the critical levels in 
absolute term. However, the first differences of the variables are stationary time series 
because we can reject the null hypothesis o f unit root process based on the D-F test. 
These results are consistent in both models with and without time trend. Thus, all 
variables in the reserve demand equation are 1(1).
On the other hand, table 4.4 presents the result of the Engle-Granger(E-G) 
cointegration test. The E-G test shows that the series o f estimated residuals from the 
cointegrating regression of the reserve demand function is stationary because the /- 
statistics are larger than the critical levels as in table 4.4. This means that since the 
variables are cointegrated of order one (i.e., 1(1)) and so the linear combination of the 
variables is stationary, we can use the estimated test statistics from the regression as in 
equation 4.3 in order to interpret the relations between the cointegrated variables.
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Table 4.3; Summary of Unit Root Test
(No trend): AZ, = « 0  Z,_, +A2,C,AZ,_, + s ,
(Trend) : A Z ,= a ^  + a^t+ S  Z,_, +
Level First Differences
Variables*
(Zr)
Lag
Length
Time
Trend
t-statistics** Lag
Length
Time
Trend
t-statistics
Reserves 5 -0.4839 4 -5.1248
(Rr) 0 X -2.1257 1 X -4.3396
GDP 3 -0.4141 6 -6.2085
2 X -1.0187 6 X -6.2926
MPI 0 -1.6251 0 -9.9120
(ZfV) 0 X -1.9655 0 X -9.9206
VOL 2 -0.4924 I -4.7291
(oi) 2 X -1.5005 I X -4.9238
LAGRES 0 -0.9265 0 -14.0970
0 X -1.7974 0 X -13.8410
Note: 1) The null hypothesis is Ho- S = 0  (Le., unit root process) in both no trend and time trend models.
2)The critical values are -2.57(10%), -2.86(5%), and -3.43(1%) for no trend model, and -3.13(10%), 
-3.41(5%), and-3.95(1%) for trend model.
3) The variables come from equation (4.3): Rt = Po+ Pi Yt + PiAPIt + P3 a, + P-tRt-i + £j
4) ** indicates insignificant at 10% level (i.e., imit-root process or nonstationary).
5) *** indicates significant at 1% level (i.e., no unit-root process or stationary).
6) Lag length is based on the lowest AIC (Akaike Information Criteria) values.
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Table 4.4: Result of Engle-Grager Cointegration Test
Cointegrating Equation iRt= + Pi GDPt + PzMPCt + VOLt + PaR i-i + Ut
p
Residual Equation (i.e.. Augmented Z)-F equation) : Azq
Variables Time Trend Lag Length t-statistics Critical Level
Residuals (z/t) I -4.6870* -4.42**
X 0 -8.7043* -5.25*"
Note: 1) The null hypothesis is no-cointegration (i.e., series has a unit-root process).
2) * are significant at 1% level.
3) ** refers to a 5 % significant level.
4) *** refers to a 1 % significant level.
5) Lag length is determined by the minimum AIC value.
The estimated result of reserve demand equation is given in table 4.5. While there 
is no evidence of heteroscedasticity, moderate multicollinearity and serial correlation 
were detected in the OLS regression. Therefore, the serial correlation was corrected by 
using the Theil-Nagar modified d  statistic, and these results are also presented in table
4.5 84
MPC, which was proxied by the variable of the average propensity to import {API), 
has a negative sign, contradicting the prediction of the price-adjustment model, consistent
84 The interpretation will be based on the estimated values after correcting the serial correlation.
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with the prediction of the standard Keynsian fixed price model. MPC insignificantly 
affects the level o f reserve demand. GDP, used as a scaling variable for the size of 
economy, is highly significant and has expected positive sign.
Table 4.5 Estimation Result of the Reserve Demand Function
Constant GDP MPC VOL R t-l TV
1.0865 0.0433 -9.8890 -0.0623 0.8865 0.1135
(0.4295) (1.7661) (-0.5787) (-2.9363) (0.0000)
Adjusted 0.9579 Durbin A statistic: 2.4412
-2.5636 0.0775 -17.6150 0.0396 0.7786 0.2214
(-0.8235) (2.6830)* (-0.8434) (1.9660) (10.280)’
Adjusted 0.9619 Durbin A statistic: 1.8777
Note: I) Numbers in first row are coefficients of the variables before correcting serial correlation.
2) Numbers in parentheses in second row indicate f-ratios before correcting serial correlatiotL
3) Numbers in fourth row are coefficients of the variables after correcting serial correlation.
4) Numbers in parentheses in fifth row indicate f-ratios after correcting serial correlation.
5) There is no evidence of autocorrelation in the regression model based on the Durbin h statistic.
6) * : significant at 1 percent level, **: significant at 10 percent level.
7) ;r indicates the speed of adjustment
The relatively high f-ratio indicates that there might be some economies of scale in the 
reserve holdings. As the scale of Korean economy grows, it conducts more international 
trade and so needs the larger volume of international reserves. This could be supported 
by the high economic growth along with the rapid growth in export and import during the 
sample period. The variability variable, VOL  ^ has an expected positive sign, and it is 
significant at 10 percent level. This result indicates that one of the foreign reserve 
managements by the Korean government is to maintain the proper level of reserves, as 
recommended by IMF (i.e., the level of reserves equivalent to three months’ imports).
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considering the fluctuations in export receipts, for example, due to the sudden changes in 
the prices o f raw materials and high fluctuations in the international markets. Based on 
the above results, the buffer stock motive of reserve holding is supported through the 
significance of variability variable ( V O L ) ,  and the transaction motive is partially 
supported through the significance of G D P  variable.
The speed of adjustment o f actual to desired reserves is about 0.22 during the 
sample period. This indicates that, given the level of exchange rate flexibility, monetary 
authorities are willing to allow (or to be corrected) 22 percent o f a disequilibrium in one 
period which is created by one unit shock in desired level of international reserves.
To find the desired reserve equation, we first need to write the short-run reserve 
function by using the estimated result:
R t  =  - 2 . 5 6 3 6  +  0 . 0 7 7 5 G D P  -  1 7 . 6 1 5 0 M P C  +  0 . 0 3 9 6 V O L  +  0 . 7 7 8 6 R t . j  (4.9)
Then, applying equation (4.4), the long-run coefficients of the demand for reserves for 
Korea can be calculated. And the predicted long-run level of reserve equation is 
generated using:
R *  =  - J 1 . 5 7 9 0  +  0 . 3 5 G D P  -  7 9 . 5 6 1 8 M P C  0 . 1 7 8 8 V O L  (4.10)
Though the reserves bottomed out around $14 billion in 1990 during the entire sample 
period, this does not provide useful information about reserve floor since the currency 
crisis occurred in 1997. Furthermore, because the reserve movements generally show an
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Figure 4.3; A ctual and Long-Run Predicted R eserves w ith Estim ated R esiduals
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upward trend during the sample period, it may be reasonable to find the reserve floor 
around the crisis period when plotted by observation. The reserve floor for Korea is 
slightly higher than $20 billion.*^ Since the level of actual reserve is close to the level 
predicted by the long-run reserve demand function (i.e., the sharp drop was forecasted by 
the demand for reserves fi'amework), the framework of demand for reserves provides 
relatively useful information about the level of the reserve floor.
The residual structure from the estimated regression shows large negative shocks to 
the reserves around the end of 1997, which could explain the fact that there were large
Observing the calculated values using the estimated equation, the predicted level of reserve is $20,1 
billion in December 1997, whereas actual value is $20.4 billion.
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capital outflows. Thus, the residual structure o f reserve equation also gives useful 
information on the reserve floor or the timing of the crisis.
Incidentally, as an alternative way to analyze the movement of reserves to the 
shocks, we can observe in figure 4.4 the conditional standard deviations around the first 
differences of reserves which have been used as a variability variable for the reserve 
demand function. This figure contains DMRES series (i.e., first-differenced reserves) 
and the upper and lower band each equal to two conditional standard deviations (i.e., the 
square root of the conditional variance) from DMRES. We can observe that as DMRES 
becomes more volatile, the width of the bands also increases. Especially in the fourth 
quarter of 1997, the DMRES becomes highly volatile. At that time, the width of the 
bands expands dramatically. That is, as the values of the previous shocks (e.g., 
continuous capital outflows) increase, the current variance of DMRES as well as the 
current DMRES itself fluctuate further.
Figure 4,4: Two Conditional Standard Deviations Around DMRES
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Note: DRES refers to a series of the first-differenced reserves (i.e., Rt~Rt.i).
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CHAPTER 5 
Empirical Test: Application to the Korean Experience
5.1 Introduction
The theoretical model solved in chapter three is applied to the empirical model for 
the recent economic experience o f Korea. This application of the crisis model provides a 
series of collapse probabilities and shadow exchange rates, which are based on the one- 
period-ahead procedure. Especially, the probability of collapse will be estimated under 
the assumptions made in the theoretical section such as a model with full sterilization and 
a time-varying stochastic risk premium as well as under the assumption o f a range of the 
reserve floor which is derived fi’om chapter four.*®
In addition to a stochastic risk premium, since three shocks appear both in the 
theoretical and empirical models, the system can be regarded as an uncertainty version of 
speculative attack, which is a departure fi’om the first generation o f  speculative attack 
models.*^
The other assumptions made in chapter 3 hold for the empirical model. They are deviation from PPP, 
two shocks associated with domestic credit creation and external credit shock, and the negative movement 
between money demand and the ratio of non-performing loans.
With a time-varying stochastic risk premium, the model contains a nonlinearity in private behavior about 
the exchange rate. This nonlinearity can be another source of currency crisis, and consequently make a 
crisis to be a self-fulfilling one through the relationship between domestic interest rate and money demand 
because this connection from the nonlinearity can change the timing of attack even witli any range of 
fundamentals. That is, the empirical application to the Korean crisis is tested only under the assumptions 
emphasized in the first generation models, such as worsening economic fundamentals with inconsistent 
economic policies, and fully sterilized operations at the attack time. Since a crisis can still arise from the 
inconsistent policies even with a stochastic model (i.e., a case of uncertainty in attacks), I don’t focus on 
the multiple equilibria arising from the nonlinearity in private or government behavior which are 
emphasized by die second generation models of currency crisis. The fact that a crisis can still arise from 
the inconsistent policies even with a stochastic model (Le., a case of imcertainty in attacks) does not mean 
that the model is necessarily a second-generation crisis model, but indicate that a modification of first 
generation attack models may have a property o f second generation models such as multiple equilibria as 
argued in Flood and Marion (1998).
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section two specifies the 
empirical models and the variables, and provides a description of how to apply the 
models using a pre-obtained data set. Section three discusses the data and presents the 
estimation results. Section four concludes.
5.2 Econometric Models and Data Description
The following equations, which are originated form the theoretical models 
developed in chapter three, are employed to calculate shadow exchange rates and the 
probability o f collapse of exchange rate regime by using econometric and a several-stage 
technique with a pre-obtained data set.
Dt -  Dt-i = fUt + S[ (5.1)
St = n '  <(>t (5.2)
where r ,  = - ^ + v „  w!th ^ ^ |A e x p (  A",,).
and with p #  ^  J : '
—  — Pj + P j + Q,  (5-3)
V, O  1 ,  r> t / -ex p (-w -ty , ) ,  i f (o^>Qwhere n ,  = -----+ 0 , with p d f  _
w 1 0 ,  i f  a>^ <Q
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a
-  = a ^ ~ +  a^ _y^  - a J ( l - 7 r J
^  —a — "N r  ~ -  \
•^r+I t-5'r+l -
I y
-a^N^ (5.4)
(5.5)
= —7 - 7
a , + a ,  + a j  a ,6 (^ B ^  - B , ) - { p ^  + c c X P t  + ^ , ) )
— P t --------------------------- ;------------------------
p ,tc r
+  A - I  + & + / :  - < ! > t ]
a ,d {B l+ i R , -R ^) ! s , }
p \n r
t t^+i —
wÀ^
(^{sa^a, -a,a,e{B^ -B ^ ) l  p]m) X, [X,+X^J
(5.6)
where k  _  j fo  ^^Ù P t +i? — —+ —
I  ' A, A,
— i s a ,  —a^6
p]vT
with
Dt-i : Lagged domestic credit.
Pt : Trend ratio of domestic credit creation. 
Yt : First source of variability in pt-
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(f>t ; Second source of variability in 
//A/ : Standard deviation o f error series yt.
I/X2  : Standard deviation o f error series
c./.) l/Xi and I/X2  series are computed in each period based on the regenerated error 
series St using an one-step-ahead forecast technique.
Pt : Price index of domestically produced goods.
Ot : Domestic aggregate price index.
at : Share of domestic goods in the price index Ot.
Si : Exchange rate (won / US $).
Pt : Systematic deviation from purchasing power parity (PPP).
: Nonsystematic deviation from PPP.
JAv : Standard deviation o f error series Df. 
yt : Output (Gross Domestic Product).
Mt : Money supply
Ô : Speed of adjustment in asset markets or degree of asset substitutability.
Bt : Stock of domestic bonds denominated by domestic currency held by private sector 
(Bo is the value ofBt  in the base year of the sample period).
B ' : Stock of foreign bonds denominated by domestic currency held by private sector. 
p* ; Foreign price index.
N't : Ratio of non-performing loans to total loans in the domestic banking system. 
m : Worldwide liquid real wealth (regarded as a constant).
/* ; Foreign interest rate.
Rc : Floor level of foreign reserves.
Ro : Level of foreign reserves held by the bank of Korea in the base year.
I ; One-step-ahead forecasts of shadow exchange rate.
: One-step-ahead forecasts of collapse probability.
Sill - S i  : Pre-announced change in the exchange rate.
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5.2.1, Description of Equations
Application of the above models for the estimation of the money demand equation, 
the shadow exchange rate, and the probability of collapse requires forecast of each 
variable described in the previous section. The first step of this procedure is to apply the 
Box-Jenkins (BJ) methodology to choose an appropriate ARIMA process o f  each variable 
during the entire sample period. Once an ARIMA model is determined, that process is fit 
over each rolling sample of 20 months o f data prior to and inclusive of period r, which 
sample is contained in the entire interval o f sample.**
This procedure provides a final data set with which the money demand equation, 
the shadow exchange rate, and the devaluation probability can be estimated and 
calculated.
Equation (5.1) ~  (5.2)
The forecast of the expected trend in domestic credit, is calculated using a
set of 20 months of rolling data. The domestic credit shock (or variability in the policy of 
credit creation), £>, is defined as forecast errors of //f (i.e., residuals of each estimation):
c ~ A  -  Dt-i + St.
The estimated credit shock is decomposed into two components. First, yt defines 
the source of variability in the policies o f domestic monetary and fiscal authorities. 
Second, <j>t^ in the errors of trend rate, reflects the variability in the external creditors. The 
relationship between these two shocks is orthogonal to each other as shown in equation
™ This method is a backward-looking forecasting procedure. The selected ARIMA processes are listed in 
the Appendix.
In equations (5.1) ~  (5.6), since all the values o f the variables are recalculated by using 20 months of 
rolling samples for the estimations o f , a n d t h e  t subscripts should be replaced by f+ i as in 
instead of//,. However, for simplicity of the expression, t subscripts will be used.
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(5.2). Once the domestic credit shock, Sc, is obtained, the shock of foreign creditors can 
be calculated by regressing external capital flows (FA) against the domestic credit 
residuals, such that St = - P FAt. The residuals from this regression imply indirectly 
induced shock by domestic authorities, which links the domestic credit shock to the flows 
of foreign capital. By the property of orthogonality, the net domestic credit shock is 
computed by yt = St - <pt-, which can be regarded as directly induced shock by domestic 
monetary or fiscal authorities.®”
Finally, the standard deviations of the above estimated random components (yt and 
^t) are corresponding to the //A; and I/À.2 as expected size of future disturbances,®  ^
where yt ~ exp(0,1/i^) for each t and ^  ~ exp(0, 7/A;) for each /.
Equation (5.3)
This equation generates forecasted values of the systematic and random deviations 
from the purchasing power parity. Equation (5.3) needs to be rewritten as 
Pc i - p*t~t-iPt where the subscript t-I indicates the forecast of pt using the one-
period-ahead procedures, in order to reflect the expected patterns of long-run departure 
from PPP. As in equation (5.2), the standard deviations of the above estimated residuals
Since these shocks are generated using the data which is created by one-step-ahead forecast of expected 
changes in those variables, the imphcit expressions of these shocks are also t^t \^-> t^t+\-> 
respectively.
As argued in Goldberg (1994), if capital inflows are positively correlated with domestic credit creation, 
which is extremely probable in the real economy, the domestic monetary shock is biased downward and 
external credit shock is biased upward. Thus, this positive relation may generate biased estimation in 
calculating m. If the estimated a? show a stable path when the foreign capital shock is not included, we 
may argue that the Korean exchange rate crisis was little affected by the external credit shock. The 
estimation results show that the estimated probabilities of collapse might not have been strongly affected by 
the change in J/À2 based on the counterfactual simulation results in the later section of this chapter. Thus, 
the degree of bias dose not seem to be large.
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series serve as a predicted relative price shock (or short-run deviation from PPP) which is 
assumed to be exponentially distributed such that H, ~ exp(0, Hw~).  Pt in equation is a
domestic goods price index, which is calculated using the method described in the next 
section.
Equation (5.4) ~ (5.6)
These three equations are estimated using an iterative procedure until the 
parameters of money demand equation converge. In the first pass through the data, the 
time-varying risk premium is assumed to be zero,^^ and thus the expected change in the 
exchange rate is computed by the difference in the interest rates as follows:
» _  -^r+i ~
4 - 4  =
which is derived from the relationship
4 = 4
Then, the money balance equation becomes
”  This is done by setting 6  =  0. The assumption of zero risk premium may cause bias in estimating tlie 
system of equations. That is, the derived shadow exchange rates and the collapse probabilities under this 
assumption would be biased downward (upward) if the risk premium in the initial pass is positive 
(negative). To some extent in which the capital inflows with high risk premium help the accumulation of 
foreign reserves and delay the speculative attacks, the collapse probability would be biased.
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a
-= ^ 0  +^2yt ^ S k z fL  
■'. .
\-b7r. -a^N^
where indicates nonzero announced changes in the exchange rate^^ and ,5, ,^ is the
expected value of the shadow exchange rate. Since we don’t know the first passes of jCt 
and , the following equation is estimated instead of the above equation.
a
-  = «0 -  aJRIV^ 4- (/, -  i] ) -
where ZR/Fis an instrument variable for to avoid possible simultaneity problem.94
OLS regression on the money demand equation gives the first estimates of ao, aj, 
Ü2, Ü3 , and Q4 , which are used to calculate the first pass of and series. The
first pass of risk premium is computed by using the first passes of (3^ +, and series 
and by obtaining the value of 9 (the 6 is estimated by regressing the following equation).
r -r-a•S’r+i
•/T ,
0( b - b ;)
sp*m
Then the money demand equation is replaced by the following form.
”  For the values of , the upper limit band (to which the exchange rate is allowed to float) are used. 
^ The instrumental variable for /, consists of the first, second ,and third lags of the interest rate.
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Once, we have second estimates for ao, ai, ü2, as, and a4  from the above regression, 
these estimated parameters are inserted to the formulas such as equations (5.5) and (5.6), 
which generate the second pass o f and series. Using these second-passes, the 
second pass o f  risk premium is estimated. With all these second passes of ^3^ ,^, ,
and risk premium, the money balance equation is reestimated for updating the values of 
ao, ai, as, as, and 0 4 . This iterative procedure continues until the parameters converge on 
their true values.^^
5.3 Estimation
Since the theoretical model developed in chapter 3 is based on the worsening 
economic fundamentals, it is necessary to describe the evolutions o f these fundamentals 
in order to select a proper sample period for the empirical analysis. Although there could 
be a number o f economic factors which might have caused the Korean currency or debt 
crisis in 1997, we briefly examine only several factors that may be considered as main 
sources associated with poor macroeconomic fundamentals.
The current account imbalance started to increase again since 1994, reaching peak 
in 1996 about 5 percent of GDP. This current account imbalance was mainly the result of
0 can be considered as a constant since its final value is determined along with the convergent parameters 
in the money demand equation in the final iteration.
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a huge trade deficit, as observed in table 5.1. Although the current account deficit in 
1996 could not be considered as so high as to directly cause the debt crisis, this 
imbalance may provide some evidence that it might have been related to currency 
overvaluation (i.e., meaning the loss of an external competitiveness which resulted in the 
accumulation of foreign debts). Even if the won against the U.S. dollar had been 
depreciated about 10 percent (firom 774 won/$ in 1995 to 844 won/$ in 1996), since the 
dollar began to be rapidly appreciated against other major currencies/^ the won, in fact, 
experienced more appreciation against the U.S. dollar than the Japanese yen.^  ^ This 
might have led to a worse position in the external competitiveness.
Table 5.1 Debt Structure in Korea
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
GDP Growth 5.8 8.6 8.9 7.1 5.0
Ratio of Current Account to GDP 0.31 -1.01 -1.81 -4.80 -3.30
Ratio of Trade Balance to GDP 0.20 -1.01 -1.40 -4.26 —
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to GDP* 13.6 16 18.2 22.4 41.8
Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Foreign Asset* 297 297 332 363 320
Ratio of Short-term Liabilities to Total Liabilities* — 72 70 68 68**
Ratio of Short-term Liabilities to Foreign Reserves* 141 154 170 213 300**
Note: 1) All numbers indicate percentage.
2) * refers to the ratio to'ward BIS Reporting Banks.
3) ** are the values as of the mid 1997.
Source: 1) Bank of International Settlements (BIS).
2) Bank oTKoxesL, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
The yen/U.S. $ rate went from 80 in the spring of 1995 to 125 in the 3"* quarter of 1997, wliich is the 
equivalent of 56 percent depreciation of the yen.
As noted earlier, though Korea adopted a maiket-average exchange rate system, one of managed floats, 
the system was set up to give much weight on the U.S. dollar in calculating the daily exchange rate.
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The GDP growth rate as in table 5.1 was still very high in 1996 about 7.1 percent, 
in spite of a slowdown from 8.9 percent in 1995. The large current account deficit in 
1996 could have been more sustainable with a high rate o f economic growth. However, 
unlike the previous currency crises of Chile and Mexico during the late 1970s and the 
early 1980s, the recent Asian crises show an inconsistent feature against the traditional 
view of unsustainability of the current account deficit and its concern with low economic 
growth. That is, the economic growth rate of most Asian countries that experienced a 
currency crisis in 1997 were very high compared to the rest of the world. As argued in 
Corsetti, et al. (1998), one possible factor to explain this paradoxical result (i.e., high 
economic growth before a crisis) is the overly optimistic expectations by domestic 
residents and foreign investors about the fiiture domestic economy, which may lead to a 
consumption and an investment boom with huge capital inflows. Under this economic 
environment, a currency or debt crisis may occur when the optimistic expectation 
changes to a skeptical one about the future economy by any internal or exogenous shock, 
and thus results in large reversal of capital flows. Based on this view, the high economic 
growth preceding the periods of crisis may not be a sufficient condition to prevent the 
currency crisis.
Even though Korea does not appear to have been rationed until the 3"* quarter of 
1997, the onset of the crisis period in the external markets, it could be said that there 
might have been the potential of credit-rationing because the percentage change o f the 
share of world investments made in Korea sharply dropped in the third quarter o f 1996. 
This rate dropped from 8.84 percent in the second quarter o f 1996 to 1.62 percent and the 
rate generally tended to decrease until the crisis period. Furthermore, the average percent
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change between the 2^^  quarter of 1996 and the same quarter of 1997 is 2.8 percent/^ 
which is a rate much less than that of the previous seven quarters (i.e., during 1994;QIV 
~ 1996:QI), 6.2 percent. Coincidentally, the foreign reserves held by the bank of Korea 
began to decline at this time (i.e., the middle of 1996), though its drop was mainly from 
the large current account deficit.
Liabilities towards BIS banks as a percent of GDP also show an upward trend, 
especially in 1996 where the percentage change o f the ratio is over 20 percent. Table 5.1 
also presents the ratio o f foreign liabilities to foreign assets toward BIS reporting banks. 
This ratio was 297 percent in 1993 and rose up to 360 percent in 1996. In the table, 
short-term liabilities towards BIS banks as a percent of total liabilities and as percent of 
foreign reserves tend to increase during the 1990s. Especially, the latter ratio peaked in
1996 to about 213 percent. This fact implies that the levels of foreign reserves held by 
the bank of Korea were not enough to cope with the liquidity crisis in case of a complete 
unwillingness by BIS banks to roll over short-term loans, as materialized in December
1997 in Korea as well as in Southeast Asian countries in the same year.^ ®
We can discuss the low profitability of the domestic firms and the increasing rate of 
non-performing loans of domestic financial institutions in terms of reflecting the 
worsening situation o f the banking system. When the loans from Korean banks to 
domestic firms became non-performing due to poor investment or bad management by 
banks or firms, the domestic banks that borrowed from foreign banks were confronted
^ If the 4* quarter of 1997 (crisis period) is included, the rate of percentage change drops sharply to 0.44 
percent
The crises had occurred even before the need to service principal on the long-term debt and interest on all 
debts.
I l l
with large short-term foreign currency debt, and this mechanism could be one of the 
major factors to illustrate the recent debt crises in Asia.
Based on the above information about the evolution of the Korean economy, the 
crisis model could be appropriately applied during the second half of 1996 and the end of 
the sample, the first half of 1998, in computing the probability o f collapse o f the 
exchange rate regime. However, we may compare befbre/afier periods of worsening 
fundamentals by including the period before the middle of 1996. Therefore, we employ 
monthly data fi'om January 1995 to June 1998 as a sample for empirical work.
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5.3.1 Description of Data
________________________Table 5.2: Description of Data
De : Domestic credit, in billions of won. IFS line 32.
Re : Foreign reserves, in billions of won. IFS line 11.
Me : Money supply. De + &
Qe : Consumer price index, IFS line 64.
Se : Exchange rate, end of period, won per U.S. dollar, IFS line ae.
: Gross Domestic Product, in billions of won, IFS line 99b, 
Converted from quarterly data to monthly series.
/f : Interest rate. Monthly market rate, IFS line 60b.
/* ; London Interbank Offer Rates (LIBOR) on one month U.S. dollar deposit, IFS.
p* : Foreign price index (U.S. consumer Price Index). IFS line 64.
; Price Index of domestically produced goods. Derivation in text. Base 1990 = 100.
IMPe : Imports, in billions of won. IFS line 71..d.
EXPe : Exports, in billions of won, IFS line 70..d.
p]s^ : Imported goods price index. Base 1990 = 100, IFS line 76.x
Rc : Set by $20 billion, estimated in chapter 4.
Ne : Ratio of non-performing loans to total loans , proxied by dishonored bills. Bank of 
Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin (Various issues).
FAe : Capital balance (Long term + short term). Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin (Various issues). 
m : World liquid real wealth. BIS, averaged from Jan. 1995 ~ Jun. 1998 and converted to 
trillions of won.
Be : Stock of domestic bonds held by Bank of Korea, Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin 
(Various issues).
B* : Stock of foreign bonds held by Bank of Korea, Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin 
(Various issues).
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To derive the nontraded goods price index ( p^), the share of traded goods (a) in the 
consumer price index must first be calculated as follows:
G D P ,
Then, the price index of domestically produced goods, is derived as
{Ot -0.-CC)-
P t = - — a
On the other hand, due to the availability of obtaining data for Nt (the ratio of non­
performing loans), this variable is proxied by the dishonored bills. Since the replaced 
variable is directly related to the ratio o f non-performing loans, the ratio of dishonored 
bills may be considered as a reasonable proxy.
5.3.2 Patterns in Domestic Credit and Prices
As shown in figure in 5.1, the path of domestic credit expansion, pt, shows stable 
movement around its mean value before the middle of 1997. During the second half of 
1997, domestic credit sharply increased, reflecting the balance of domestic and foreign 
reserves in the monetary base. That is, as shown in figure 3.1, the domestic credit 
substantially expanded while foreign reserves sharply declined, led by the sterilization 
intervention by the domestic monetary authorities at the beginning of crisis. The 
expected change in domestic credit using the 20 month backward-looking forecast
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procedure, , is also shown in figure 5.L  The real and forecasted values of fit move
closely toward each other. Figure 5.2 shows the estimate of randomness about the trend 
of domestic credit creation and the estimate of externally induced credit variability, 
respectively.
Figure 5.1: Actual and Predicted Changes in Domestic Credit
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The variability of shocks stemming from a pure source of domestic monetary policy 
shows no specific trend until the middle of 1997. After that, however, it largely 
fluctuates through the rest of the sample period. This movement in //Ay matches up well 
with the path o f one-period-ahead forecast of domestic credit growth The
variability of externally induced credit shows upward fluctuation from the middle of 1996
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Figure 5.2: Domestic ( I / X i )  and Foreign (1/X-,') Credit Shocks
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and larger fluctuation through the second half o f 1997. This variability begins to 
sharply increase from the middle of 1997 to the end of sample period, during which time 
Korea experienced the currency crisis.
5.3.3 Patterns in Relative Price of Domestic Goods
The forecasts of the relative price of domestic goods, which is estimated
using the Box-Jenkins forecasting method based on XhtARIMA (1,1,1), is shown in figure 
5.3. The path of relative price shows a steady upward trend until the middle of 1995. 
From the second half of 1995, the relative price increased at the time of currency 
appreciation, and began to decline in the middle of 1996 with a low level o f depreciation. 
The relative price subsided in the beginning o f 1997 from which period the currency has
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Figure 5.3: Relative Price ( o )
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been largely depreciated, and substantially precipitated in the 4*^  quarter of the same year, 
implying a large loss of Korean currency value. The overall movement of pt (relative 
price of domestic goods) reflects well the pattern of Korean currency, suggesting the low 
rate of currency depreciation and so the loss of competition in the world market led by 
overvaluation of the won during the sample period. Figure 5.3 also reflects that the 
systematic deviation from PPP exists, though it is not so large, due to higher rate of 
domestic inflation than that of foreign inflation through the sample period.
Based on figure 5.4, which shows the shock of relative price (or random deviation 
from PPP), the market did not expect high risk about the relative price since the 
variability o f the short-run deviation from PPP moved smoothly until the first quarter of
The US CPI was used as a proxy for the foreign price level. This might lead to overvaluation of the won 
through the exchange rate because the Korean exchange rate system required much weight on the U.S. 
dollar in calculating the daily exchange rate.
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1997. However, the risk of relative price shocks sharply increased in the fourth 
quarter o f 1997 and continuously rose, remaining at very high levels in the rest of the 
sample period along with a large loss in the value of the won.
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Figure 5.4: Relative Price Shock
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The share of nontraded goods((z) in the Consumer Price Index is shown in figure 
5.5, which illustrates a downward trend through the sample period. It decreases from a 
high of 55 percent in early 1995 to a low of 22 percent in late 1997.
1 1 8
Egme S5; Siare of Ntirtraded Goods parent
Q55
Q45
Q40
Q35
Q30
025
020
1995 1996 1998
5.3.4 Estimation Results
Using an iterative estimation procedure, the system of equations provides one- 
period-ahead probabilities of collapse, shadow exchange rates, a money market 
equilibrium condition, and risk premia. The predicted probabilities and shadow exchange 
rates are presented in table 5.3, and the plots of these estimates are shown in figure 5.6 
and 5.7, respectively. The market clearing rates can be regarded as a lower limit in which 
domestic monetary and fiscal policies are consistent with the existing exchange rate 
regime.
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Table 5.3: Actual and Shadow Exchange Rates, and Collapse Probabilities
Year Actual* Shadow* Year Actual* Shadow* TTt
1995:01 786.7 690.1 0.00019 1996:10 831.3 805.6 0.00031
1995:02 786.0 709.6 0.00003 1996:11 828.7 792.0 0.00038
1995:03 771.5 721.6 0.00055 1996:12 844.2 805.8 0.00026
1995:04 761.8 720.8 0.00012 1997:01 861.3 941.8 0.00078
1995:05 760.1 743.0 0.00041 1997:02 863.9 963.3 0.00087
1995:06 758.1 750.1 0.00015 1997:03 897.1 925.2 0.00077
1995:07 756.5 745.9 0.00084 1997:04 892.1 918.3 0.00297
1995:08 771.1 765.9 0.00040 1997:05 891.8 918.0 0.00154
1995:09 768.4 750.1 0.00017 1997:06 888.1 920.9 0.00063
1995:10 765.5 736.6 0.00021 1997:07 892.0 912.4 0.00195
1995:11 769.2 752.6 0.00117 1997:08 902.0 894.6 0.00072
1995:12 774.7 767.4 0.00018 1997:09 914.8 939.6 0.05702
1996:01 784.3 779.0 0.00021 1997:10 965.1 901.7 0.39078
1996:02 780.7 779.4 0.00084 1997:11 1063.8 948.2 0.74167
1996:03 782.7 806.8 0.00054 1997:12 1695.8 1714.8 0.40517
1996:04 778.7 816.2 0.02388 1998:01 1572.9 1654.3 0.17139
1996:05 787.9 812.8 0.00023 1998:02 1633.0 1674.2 1.00000
1996:06 810.6 794.8 0.00011 1998:03 1383.0 1398.1 0.87143
1996:07 813.3 811.4 0.00025 1998:04 1336.0 1164.2 0.05810
1996:08 819.4 809.4 0.00100 1998:05 1407.0 1197.6 0.03229
1996:09 821.2 808.0 0.00092 1998:06 1373.0 1233.2 0.04776
* won. / U.S. dollar exchange rate
The collapse probabilities remained at very low levels through the first half of 1996, 
which were smaller than one percent. An exception during this period occurred in April 
1996 when the estimated probability marks 2.4 percent and the market clearing rates 
exceeded the actual exchange rates around this time. However, no profitable speculations 
against the won seemed to take place during this period because the market perceived that 
Korea was not rationed in the external credit, which ration would have been critical in 
sustaining the existing exchange rate system. Based on the estimated probabilities and
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shadow rates, the markets continued to expect no certain atmosphere o f speculation on 
the foreign reserves in the second half o f 1996, though the won was continuously 
depreciated at this time/°^
Figure 5.6: Collapse Pk-obabOhy of an Exchange Rate Regime
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Figure 5.7 suggests that the actual exchange rates were overvalued through 1997 
according to the market clearing rates. This implies the continuous depreciation of the 
won was not enough to achieve market equilibrium, and so the collapse probabilities 
began to rise through the third quarter of 1997. In October and November 1997, while 
the market equilibrium levels of exchange rates (solved in the system o f models) were
Even if the exchange rate system adopted by Korea during the sample period was not a pure fixed 
system, it could be regarded as a crawling peg since the exchange rate was controlled such that it was 
allowed to move within the announced band. Titus, under this system, the successful attack could make 
profits as in the model.
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still exceeded by the actual exchange rates, the predicted probabilities of collapse 
increased dramatically with precipitately falling foreign reserves held by the bank of 
Korea caused by the obviously profitable speculations. Ultimately, in December 1997, 
the existing exchange rate regime collapsed and the Korean currency, the won, lost its 
value significantly (about 60 percent) compared with November 1997.
Figure 5.7: Actual and Predicted-Shadnw F.xrhange Rates
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As the market clearing rates exceeded the actual rates through March 1998 and as 
the collapse probabilities peaked at this point, the market participants did not show 
confidence in the stability of the new policy of the exchange rate system in spite of new 
debt scheduling agreements with IMF. After that point, the collapse probabilities 
dropped sharply, though they remain still at relatively high levels, thanks to the market’s
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perceptions o f enough depreciation of the won to retain the market equilibrium as 
suggested by the shadow rates and probabilities.
The risk premium is plotted in figure 5.8. According to the portfolio theory, 
domestic interest rates are expected to reflect the risk feature of the domestic assets. The 
risk premium varies over the sample around its mean value until the middle of 1997, 
indicating that there exists a certain fluctuation in the expected exchange rate changes. In 
the end of 1997, the changes in risk premium became large enough to reflect the 
readjustment o f a portfolio of desired asset holdings. With this result, we may conclude 
that interest rates reflected the expected rate of depreciation in the won to some extent 
and so there may have existed the breakdown of the interest parity condition.
Figure 5.8: Risk Premium
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Finally, the estimated coefficients of the parameters in the money demand equation, 
computed by an iterative procedure, are presented in table 5.4 with t-value of each
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variable in the equation/®^ The parameter on the GDP has the correct sign and 
significantly afifects the money balance function. The currency substitution negatively 
afifects the money demand, as expected, but its impact is not significant. On the other 
hand, introducing the ratio of non-performing loans also gives a significant influence on 
the money demand, although positively signed.
Table 5.4: Money Demand Equation
Clo OTl *2 as #4
217.06 20.7544 0.03831 -150.8355 256.3470 0.8058
(1.5419) (3.2639)* (8.6536)* (-0.5802) (2.8801)*
Note: I) Numbers in parentheses are r-ratios. 
2) * is significant at 1 percent level.
5.3.5 Analysis of the Causes of the Korean Exchange Rate Crisis.
In this section, we analyze the impacts of changes in domestic credits shocks, 
external credit shocks, purchasing power parity shocks, and sterilization policy on the 
probability of collapse. This study is performed by increasing or decreasing the levels of 
shocks, given the money demand parameters which were already estimated in the
104previous section.
The number of iteration taken in the procedure was seven, and the estimated value of Ô was 0.00032.
The regression coefficients of the money demand equation provided close results when the serial 
correlation was corrected using GLS estimation. One of the possible reasons of this result appears to come 
firom the property o f  the iteration since the estimated parameters are different before iteration but the results 
show very similar or same values between two regressions when the iterative regression is converged.
This method is used in Goldberg (1994) where it is called counterfactual simulation.
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The change in the externally induced shocks are positively related with the change 
in probability, though the size of changes in the probability is not so large. When the 
external credit shock is decreased by one-half, the collapse probability also drops by 14 
percent in October 1997, and 12 percent in December 1997. The magnitude of the 
probability changes are trivial at other sample periods. However, based on the declined 
Kt during the above months, it could be said that smaller foreign credit shocks would have 
reduced or delayed the currency collapse around the end of 1997, to some extent, 
although the Korean crisis would have been unavoidable with only slightly reduced 
external creditor’s shocks.
The next study is associated with the implications of how the change in the 
domestically induced credit shock influenced the speculative attacks on the won. When 
the uncertainty concerned with domestic monetary and fiscal behaviors is decreased by 
one-half, the collapse probabilities increased at the range of the sample period before 
November 1997 at which time the % declined by 30 percent. The increased magnitude in 
the probabilities between December 1997 and January 1998 is about 34 percent in 
average. After that time, the size o f changes in the probability is quite small.
This finding is an intuitively unexpected result and is similar to that of Goldberg 
(1994).^°^ However, since the probabilities of collapse after January 1998 do not rise so 
largely (about 7 percent increase in average during this period), it could be said that 
decreasing the uncertainty around domestic credit patterns would not have led to higher
This similarity seems to stem from tlie fact that the two models (i.e., the model developed by Goldberg 
and the model used in the chapter 3 of this paper) are based on the monetary and first generation 
speculative attack models that emphasize inconsistent domestic economic environment or fimdamentals 
with the domestic credit behavior. Especially, the fact that a factor reflecting the uncertainty surrounding 
the patterns in domestic credit creation appears in one of two exponential terms of the derived ar, may make
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speculative opportunities, unlike the analysis in Goldberg (1994; p.427) where she 
mentioned that “this theoretical possibility can arise when 1/Xi is sufficiently large. In 
this case, further increases in l/X i serve to decrease the expectation that the shadow 
exchange rate will exceed the announced controlled exchange rate.” In fact, this inverse 
movement may occur when the sufficient condition for the positive correlation between 
7Ui and L/Xi is not sustained. Following this interpretation, a negative relationship 
between % and //A/ can also arise when 7/A/ increases with the condition that the other 
two shocks (i.e., foreign creditor shock and random price shock) show inverse movement, 
based on the analysis of the theoretical model developed in chapter 3.
Although there exists a theoretical possibility which could lead to an inverse pattern 
in Tit and //Ay, the market’s speculative moods on the won might not have been reversed 
by more weighting on the variability surrounding domestic credit behavior once the won 
slipped into the chaos.
Even though the impact of smaller variability in relative price shock (Z/'vv) on the % 
declines, the size of changes in collapse probability is negligible in the whole range of the 
sample period. These insignificant changes in Kt could come from the continuous 
depreciation of the won since the middle of 1995, which might have reduced the 
substantial relative price shock in the fourth quarter of 1997. Therefore, according to the 
above relationship between Kt and 7/w, we may conclude that the other small levels of 
realignments o f the currency before and/or during the crisis period would not have much 
alleviated the speculative atmosphere on the won around December 1997.
it possible for the Kt to move inversely with 7/A/, hi short, this negative relationship may be regarded as a 
particular property of the models which emphasize the domestic monetary policy.
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As another factor, rather than shocks, which would have affected the collapse 
probability during the crisis period, we can consider the role of sterilization policy 
adopted by the Korean monetary authority. The sterilization operation is performed 
through the purchase and sale of domestic and foreign bonds by the central bank. Based 
on the previous chapter’s theoretical model, as the monetary authority further sterilizes 
against the attacks on the central bank’s foreign r e s e r v e s Kc is expected to rise. This 
mechanism of positive relationship between iCt and sterilization is based on the model 
which emphasizes the conflict between two economic policies, for example, such as the 
policy of continuous domestic credit creation and the policy o f sustaining a fixed 
exchange rate regime, faced with exhaustion of foreign reserves. Here, the sterilization 
against the attacks on the central bank foreign reserves can be an additional source that 
can further create domestic credit.
The pattern of changes in TVt is not so large. When the amount o f domestic bond 
held by the bank of Korea declined by one-half, the collapse probabilities also lowered 
about 10 percent between September 1997 and December 1997. During January 1998 
and end of sample, however, the changes in TVt with the lower level of Bt are quite small. 
Even though the influence of sterilization policy on the collapse probability, viewed in 
the light of the estimated model, is not substantial, the positive relationship between rct 
and Bt could imply that the credibility and the sustainability of the existing Korean 
exchange rate system would have been undermined by the market’s uncertainty on the 
government policy to sustain the system, faced with weak economic fundamentals such
In both theoretical and econometric models, foreign bonds ( 5 * )  do not appear in the derived ;r,.
Therefore, whether or not the sterilization policy affects the collapse probability is examined only through 
the change in the domestic bonds (5,). A sterilization operation indicates an increase in the domestic bonds.
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as low levels o f foreign reserves. Therefore, on the grounds of the above estimates of % 
we may conclude that if the sterilization operation by the Korean monetary authority 
during the fourth quarter of 1997 had been one-half of that actually performed, the 
collapse probability would have been lowered, to some degree, by decreasing one of 
sources which might have increased domestic credit creation.
5.4 Conclusion
The collapse probabilities and shadow exchange rates which were estimated using 
the econometric model based on the theoretical section give some implications on the 
Korean experience during the period of 1997-1998.
Though the forecasts of the shadow exchange rates did not anticipate the 
expectation o f profit by attacking the won in a certain sample period, the estimated 
shadow rates foretold the continuous speculative atmosphere between December 1997 
and the first quarter o f 1998, along with increasing probabilities o f collapse. Especially, 
the probabilities were sharply climbing since November 1997 when the level of foreign 
reserves began to drop precipitately due to the speculative attacks on the won, along with 
additional sources exhausting the reserves by sterilization operation. Thereafter, the 
remaining o f the shadow rates at high levels gives a suggestion that the market’s 
expectation about the government’s exchange rate policy was still uncertain even with the 
government’s debt rescheduling agreement with international creditors in January 1998.
From the previous section’s analysis on the influence of Kt when changing the 
levels of shocks and the magnitude of sterilization, given the money demand equation, 
we could trace out some causes of the Korean episode. The study suggests that the
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Korean currency crisis would have been alleviated to some degree by lowering the 
uncertainty surrounding anticipated external credit shock and by reducing the scale of 
monetary growth which in part originated from the sterilization policy during the crisis 
period-
The increases in the forecasts o f variability in the domestic credit creation lowered 
the probability of collapse before February 1998 to about 30 percent. It is, however, 
uncertain whether or not the increases in the uncertainty of the domestic credit policy 
would have reduced the speculative behavior because the estimated probabilities still 
remained at high levels after that point.^°^ Even with smaller values of K( along with 
lower relative price shocks, the small levels of realignments in the won before and/or 
during the crisis period would not have much reduced the speculative pressures against 
the won since the changed magnitude in Kt was negligible.
Based on the pervious section’s results the crisis model predicted relatively well, 
although it did not fit quite well over the whole sample range. These less satisfactory 
results compared to previous work such as Goldberg (1994) seem to be mainly related to 
the highly stylized model used in chapter 3 (even if the model was modified from the 
standard models of currency crises in order to describe some characteristics of Korean 
crisis such as sterilization policy, adding the ratio of non-performing loans into the 
money demand equation).
Another reason for the uncertainty of the change in Kt with the lower level of UXi requires the 
breakdown of the sufficient condition. The condition is found in the section of comparative statics in 
chapter 3 where the positive relationship between Kt and 1/Xi is shown.
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CHAPTER 6 
Summary and Conclusions
This dissertation extends the theory on exchange rate and balance of payments 
crises and provides empirical evidence for the 1997 Korean currency crisis on the basis of 
the theoretical framework.
There exist two competing theoretical views in the literature on the speculative 
attacks and currency crises. The first view, so-called standard or first generation models 
of currency crises, stresses the relation between investors’ speculation behavior and 
deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals as a main source of the crisis. On the other 
hand, the second view, so-called second generation models of currency crises, attributes 
the main causes of the crisis to the market’s abrupt speculative activity, rather than pre­
crisis inconsistency between worsening fundamentals and the existing fixed exchange 
rate regime.
Even though these views have their own advantages in understanding a certain 
crisis, the recent Korean episode can not be explained on the basis of a merely one-side 
view. In this respect, the main purpose of this paper is to attempt to provide a better 
illustration of the 1997 Korean currency crisis.
For this purpose, following an introductory chapter which explained the necessity, 
the goal and the direction of this study, and following a literature survey in chapter 2, 
chapter 3 provided a theoretical framework in order to incorporate the first and second 
generation models by introducing several crucial assumptions that are stressed in both 
generation models, though the basic models come from the monetary model of exchange
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rate determination which is a modified version of standard models such as Krugman 
(1979) and Flood and Garber (1984b) models.
The assumptions added to the model are as followings: (1) a relaxation of PPP; (2) 
an inclusion of income in the money demand equation; (3) a sterilization of the losses of 
foreign reserves during the speculative attacks; (4) an inclusion of external and internal 
credit shocks; (5) inclusions of currency substitution motive and the ratio of non­
performing loans in the money demand function; and (6) an introduction of a time- 
varying risk premium to the interest parity condition. While the first four are added to 
the model to overcome the weakness of previous standard speculative attack models, the 
last two help the first generation models to incorporate second generation models.
Chapter 4 estimated the level of the reserve floor by using a partial adjustment 
model based on the optimizing approach. This method has the advantage of 
incorporating the behavior o f foreign reserves with the several macroeconomic variables 
that influenced the determination of foreign reserves around the problematic period. This 
chapter illustrated the patterns of current and capital accounts along with the movement 
of international reserves. Also, this chapter presented the exchange rate system during 
the sample period in Korea and the patterns in the exchange rate surrounding the crisis 
period.
The predicted critical reserve floor that was used to calculate the collapse 
probability in chapter 5 was close to the actual nominal value of foreign reserves held by 
the bank of Korea during the time of the crisis. Furthermore, the long-run reserve 
demand function provided relatively useful information about the capital flows at the 
time of speculative attacks. That is, the residual structure fi'om the estimated regression
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shows large negative shocks to the foreign reserves in the fourth quarter o f 1997, 
implying that the reserves indeed fell under their desired levels as the crisis was surfacing 
and there were also large capital outflows during this time.
In chapter 5, using an iterative estimation procedure, the system of empirical 
models which was developed and solved in chapter 3 provided one-period-ahead 
probability of a regime collapse, shadow exchange rates, money market equilibrium 
condition, and risk premium for the 1997 Korean experience. For the variables in the 
estimation models, monthly data during the 1995-1998 period was reobtained by using a 
backward-looking forecasting procedure, which is based on the Box-Jenkins 
methodology, to choose an appropriate AR2M4 process of each variable.
On the basis of theoretical and analytical frameworks made in previous chapters, 
the empirical results provide the following conclusions. First, the actual exchange rates 
were overvalued through 1997 according to the estimated market clearing rates. This 
implies that the continuous nominal depreciation o f the won in pre-crisis period was not 
enough to achieve market equilibrium. Thus, the collapse probability of the existing 
exchange rate regime began to rapidly increase from the third quarter of 1997. Moreover, 
the market participants’ confidence in the new government policy of exchange rate was 
not recovered through March 1998, in spite of new debt scheduling with IMF and other 
foreign creditors, since the actual exchange rates were continuously exceeded by the 
shadow rates. However, the market’s credibility on the Korean foreign exchange market 
began to restore after that time with market’s perception o f enough depreciation to retain 
the market equilibrium level as indicated in the patterns o f shadow rates and the collapse 
probabilities.
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Second, according to the counterfactual simulation results, the collapse probabilities 
decreased about 14 percent during the crisis time when the external credit shocks were 
lowered by one-half Thus, the smaller foreign credit shocks could have reduced the 
possibility of regime collapse. This result implies that the timing of the crisis could have 
been delayed with more reserve holdings o f the bank o f Korea by buffering the external 
shocks to some degree, although the crisis in Korea would have still ultimately been 
unavoidable only with this amount of reduced external shock.
Third, since an increasing uncertainty surrounding domestic credit creation provides 
negative impacts on the collapse probabilities depending on the sample period, it is 
unclear whether or not the increase in uncertainty of domestic credit policy would have 
reduced the speculative behavior. Although there exists a theoretical possibility which 
could lead to an inverse pattern between collapse probability and domestic credit shock, 
the market’s speculative moods on the won might not have been reversed by more 
weighting on the variability surrounding domestic credit behavior once the won slipped 
into the chaos, based on the counterfactual simulation result.
Fourth, even though the collapse probability moves in the same direction as relative 
price shocks, its scale in movement of the probability was negligible, following the result 
of counterfactual simulation. These insignificant changes in Kt could come from the 
continuous depreciation of the won since the middle of 1995, which might have reduced 
the substantial relative price shock in the fourth quarter o f 1997. Therefore, according to 
the above relationship between Kt and //V, we may conclude that the other small levels of 
realignments of the currency before and/or during the crisis period would not have much 
alleviated the speculative atmosphere on the won around December 1997.
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Fifth, the influence of sterilization policy on the collapse probability, viewed in the 
light of the estimated model, is not substantial. The positive relationship between Tit and 
Bt, however, could imply that the credibility and the sustainability o f the existing Korean 
exchange rate system would have been undermined by the market’s uncertainty about the 
government policy to sustain the system, faced with weak economic fundamentals such 
as the low level of foreign reserves. Therefore, on the grounds of the above estimates of 
probability, we may conclude that if the sterilization operation by the Korean monetary 
authority during the fourth quarter of 1997 had been one-half of that actually performed, 
the collapse probability would have lowered, to some degree, by decreasing one of the 
sources which might have increased domestic credit creation.
Although the above conclusions give some policy implications for avoiding or 
delaying the currency crisis especially in the short-run (i.e., during the crisis), a more 
principle way to prevent a future crisis is for the Korean economic system to have 
stronger fundamentals such as running current account balance along with a more 
flexible exchange rate policy. In balancing the current account, the role o f trade surplus 
should be more emphasized rather than the role of large capital account surplus. This is 
because balancing or running current account surplus in this way would prevent the 
currency crisis from being triggered by self-fulfilling speculative attacks (by decreasing 
the magnitude of short-term foreign debt) as well as by depletion of international reserves 
(by increasing usable foreign reserves). In this regard, we have a lesson from the 1997 
Korean crisis, though it is needless to say, that the problem of income redistribution by 
holding large amounts of international reserves can be more than offset by the economic
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and social costs of recovering the collapsed economy back to the pre-crisis level, as in 
Korea as well as other southeast Asian countries in 1997.
As another lesson, capital flows should be monitored by the government and by the 
private sector and be controlled by the government to avoid a moral hazard problem and 
thus to generate a more stable financial system. For this purpose, the disconnection 
between economic matter and political matter should be preceded, and then the economy 
be operated under the principal of the market economy system. All these efforts will give 
the market more credibility on the economic system. Finally the coordination with Asian 
countries as well as developed countries, and with international financial institutions 
(e.g., IMF, World Bank, and EBRD) is required to improve the weakness of the 
international financial system and so to prevent a future economic crisis.
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Appendix
Table A.l : A R I M A  Processes of the Variables
Domestic Credit — (Dr) (2,1,3)
Foreign Reserves — (&) ARIMA (\\IA 5\\X 0)*
Money Supply — ARIMA OXQ)
Income (GDP) — (yj ARM A {2,1,2)
Domestic Interest Rate — (4) ARIMA {2,1,0)
Foreign Interest Rate — (/* ) ARIMA {2,1,2)
Consumer Price Index — (Of) ARIMA (3,1,0)
Foreign Price Index — (/?*) (II 1,2,3,711,1,0)"
Capital Balance — {FA^ ARIMA (1,0,0)
Domestic Bonds — (DJ ARIMA {2,\,2)
Foreign Bonds -  (D* ) ARIMA {2,1,0)
Growth Rate o f Domestic Credit — (Uf) ARIMA {2,1,2)
Ratio of Dishonored Bill -  (M) ARIMA {1,1,0)
Share of Domestic Goods in the CPI — (%) ARIMA {2,1,2)
Systematic Deviation of Purchasing Power Parity — (Ot) A R IM A {\,\,\)
Note : * indicates a non-stationaiy process of foreign reserves such as iî, = Rt.i -r -r Rts. 
** refers to a non-stationary process of foreign price such as
P\ = P\-x + P\-z + P\-z + P\-i -
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